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SUMMARY
C++ and Microsoft's Component Object Model (COM) are examples of a high-level lan-
guage and development framework that were built on top of the lower-level, primitive lan-
guage, C. C was never designed to support concepts like object orientation, type enforcement,
and language independence. Further, these languages and frameworks are designed to com-
pile and run directly on the processor where these concepts are also not supported. Other
high-level languages that do support these concepts make use of a runtime or virtual machine
to create a computing model to suit their needs. By forcing these high-level concepts into
a primitive computing model, many security issues have been introduced. Existing binary-
level security analysis tools and runtime enforcement frameworks operate at the lowest level
of context. As such, they struggle to detect and remedy higher-level security issues. In this
dissertation, a framework for elevating the context of binary code is presented. By bringing
the context for analysis closer to where these security issues are introduced, this framework




As is often the case, when a fundamental technology is adapted and abstracted for higher-
level concepts, security issues arise. Take for example, the use of HTTP as the transport
protocol for web applications. HTTP  a stateless protocol  has to be pretty drastically
misused to support stateful web applications, leading to myriad security issues. This same
concept exists at the programming language level. C served as the primary programming
language for many years. C is an extremely low-level language, providing very little abstrac-
tion from processor-level primitives. With that, there is a very close coupling between the
computing model of the processor and the programming model of C. C types are one-to-one
representations of types available at the processor level. Memory allocations and accesses
represent direct access to the memory used to store data (of course, ignoring virtual mem-
ory layout). Because of this close coupling to the processor, C provides developers with
extremely powerful tools that allow for the extreme optimization of their code. Of course,
with great power comes great responsibility. C developers shoulder the responsibility of
enforcing types, ensuring proper memory accesses, and general error checking.
As applications became more and more complex, and programming became a necessary
skill for the masses, C became an unwieldy tool that did not meet the needs for many
developers. The advent of object oriented programming, type-enforcement, and language
independence required higher-level language constructs than those provided in C. The rst
steps toward providing these constructs was to build higher-level languages on top of C. In
fact, early C++ compilers actually translated the C++ code into C. C++, for example,
builds on top of the C struct type. The struct type was not intended to support object
orientation, but by adding some compile-time modications, it became the foundation for
objects in C++. Extending this concept to yet another level of abstraction, Microsoft's
Component Object Model (COM) is built on top of C++. COM provides a framework
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for self-describing, language independent, type-enforced object orientation with a standard
interface. Note that none of the properties of COM just listed are actually properties of, or
enforceable in, C++.
Much like the HTTP example, using C as the fundamental building block for C++ and
COM has led to security issues. Because there is no type enforcement at the C level (because
it is not enforced by the processor), it is impossible to build proper type enforcement for
C++ of COM. Because there is no implicit reference counting for memory allocations, issues
like memory leaks and use-after-free conditions are possible. As will be seen throughout this
dissertation, oftentimes, the inventors of these higher-level languages try to x these exact
kinds of issues. However, this is only so much that can be done since the primary building
block was not designed to support these concepts. In fact, as we will show, it is often the
attempt to x these issues that leads to other security issues.
In this work, we discuss the details of how these adaptations and abstractions have led to
security issues. We cover issues that are introduced into these higher-level constructs at the
time objects are instantiated, as they are used during their lifetime, and as they are being
deleted. In the case of C++, security issues arise at instantiation time when constructors fail
to properly execute. During their lifetime, we see issues with type confusion and the security
issues associated with treating an object of the wrong type. Because object deletion is the
onus of the developer, we nd problems that arise causing use-after-free conditions. In the
case of COM, we show the security issues that arise when instantiation fails. Throughout the
lifetime of a COM object, we will demonstrate issues related to type confusion, the copying
of objects, and a trust transitivity issue that exists in the COM security infrastructure. As
COM objects are deleted, we will show issues that occur when deletion is handled incorrectly.
Software security vulnerabilities are as old as software itself. Because of this, many
security analysis frameworks and runtime enforcement engines have been developed to try
to eliminate and/or mitigate these problems. Static analysis frameworks that function on
source code have shown signicant progress toward reducing the number of vulnerabilities
that are released into production code. However, many applications are still commonplace
on modern-day operating systems that were developed prior to the widespread adoption of
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such source code analysis tools. Additionally, not every software vendor employs such tools,
or maintains strict secure coding practices throughout their software development life cycle.
With that, when closed source applications are deployed in the world, the user has no other
way to evaluate their true security risk than analyzing the binary code. Further, if security
issues are discovered, runtime enforcement engines (e.g., host-based IDS, anti-virus systems,
etc.) must interface with these applications through binary insertion.
The static analysis frameworks that were developed for analyzing source code have a
major advantage over those that much interface with the resultant binary code: context.
As high-level code is compiled, much of the context present in the source code is lost. In
essence, the high-level constructs present in C++ and COM have to be translated into some
low-level contextual equivalent that can be represented and operated on by the processor.
As discussed, the processor has no concept of an object (C++ or COM object). The process
of compilation translates these higher-level constructs into their lower-level counterparts.
Because the goal of this work is to address security issues introduced into applications by
high-level language constructs, operating at the low-level context provided by binaries is
insucient.
1.1 Thesis Statement
The work presented in this dissertation will show how by elevating the context of binary
code, we can then apply higher-level analyses to address the more complex security issues
introduced by C++ and COM. We describe how decompiling binary code into a high-level
intermediate representation allows us to reconstruct high-level constructs like C++ objects
and COM objects. With this high-level context regained, we can adapt and apply analyses
that had only previously been applicable to source code analysis. Additionally, we can
properly inform runtime enforcement engines to address security issues while still only being
able to interface with applications through binary injection. We explain the feasibility of
such work by suggesting the following thesis statement:
C++ and Microsoft's Component Object Model (COM) build upon the lower-level C
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language. To allow for object oriented design, these programming paradigms extend, some-
times to a dangerous extent, the features of C, allowing developers to inadvertently introduce
complex security vulnerabilities. The static analysis and runtime enforcement frameworks
intended to address these types of vulnerabilities operate in a lower-level context than that
in which the vulnerabilities were introduced. By reconstructing C++ and COM objects from
their compiled counterpart, we can eectively elevate the context of binary-level frameworks,
allowing for the development of more complex analyses and enforcement logic to address
previously undetectable vulnerabilities.
The security vulnerabilities presented in this dissertation continue to plague the software
world. With the current state of aairs, we are attempting to solve extremely complex
problems with comparatively simple solutions. Developments like those presented in this
work are a necessary step toward increasing the security of applications that are critical to
our everyday lives.
1.2 Contributions
In this dissertation, we make the following contributions:
 Construct a general C++ decompilation framework: We create a framework
for reversing C++ compiled code into the intermediate representation used by the
LLVM compiler infrastructure, allowing an analyst to employ any of the dozens of
pre-built analyses that ship with LLVM. We implemented this system as a plugin
for the popular IDA Pro disassembler. With this framework, we are able to resolve
dynamically dispatched virtual calls in C++.
 Develop an object reaching denition analysis algorithm for the detection
of type confusion vulnerabilities: Using the framework described above, we were
able to implement a set of data ow algorithms which can trace object types from
their instantiation to their use. Then, at each use point, we can programmatically
determine whether the usage of that object conforms to its denition. By nding
cases where objects are treated as an incorrect type, we can nd instances of vtable
4
escape vulnerabilities.
 Develop a general-purpose data ow algorithm for detection of use-after-
free conditions: We present and formally dene a data ow algorithm based on a
technique from compiler theory known as available expression analysis. Our technique,
called Available Object Denition Analysis (AODA) can be used by source code anal-
ysis tools, compilers and binary static analysis frameworks to identify use-after-free
conditions.
 Discover and characterize a systemic weakness in the COM security infras-
tructure: We demonstrate that the existing killbit list security policies governing the
instantiation of COM objects can easily be circumvented. We show that due to a
weakness in the underlying COM architecture, many COM objects that are part of
the default installation of the operating system can load other objects without ever
consulting a policy of any kind. We demonstrate that this attack is possible through
virtually every application that is commonly installed on Windows.
 Design and implement a prototype policy enforcement infrastructure for
COM objects: We design and implement a prototype infrastructure for the system-
wide COM instantiation policy enforcement, which we call COMBlocker. In this sys-
tem, we are able to quickly compare (average lookup time of 554µs) the instantiation
of COM objects against a global policy. Our approach is eective as it uses binary
rewriting to force all COM object instantiations to be compared against the global
policy, thus mitigating the above attack. We then compare our proposed solution
to the patch recently issued by Microsoft (Security Bulletin MS10-036), which was
created in response to our private disclosure of the vulnerability.
 Discover and dene several new classes of vulnerability: In this work we
provide the denition of several new exploitable vulnerability classes including C++
constructor failure, COM retention and initialization failure, COM type confusion and
trust transitivity, and COM object release failures.
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1.3 Dissertation Outline
In Chapter 2, we discuss the related research to this eld. Here we will nd that signicant
eort has been applied to the static analysis of source code, and the analysis of C-level
security issues in binary code, but little work has been applied to the analysis of high-level
constructs at the binary level.
Chapters 3 provides the background required for the reader to understand the low-level
technical details of how these vulnerabilities arise and how they can be addressed. A through
understanding of how a compiler translates high-level language constructs to a context that
can be understood by a processor is necessary to understand how these issues can be detected
through static analysis and enforced at runtime.
Chapters 4, 5, and 6 discuss the security issues that arise with complex types as they
are instantiated, during their lifetime, and as they are deleted. Failures during object
instantiation can result in very subtle bugs that can lead to exploitation. Throughout the
lifetime of and object, there are several ways a developer can introduce security issues like
type confusion. The improper deletion of objects can lead to use-after-free conditions.





2.1 Binary Analysis Frameworks
The focus of this work is on elevating the context of binary applications for the purposes of
static analysis and runtime enforcement. Many tools have been developed in the past for the
purposes of reversing binary code into an intermediate representation. Cousot and Cousot
showed that by restructuring a language into an abstract representation, complex analyses
are more easily implemented [19]. Following this concept, Song, et al. developed the BitBlaze
framework for binary decompilation and analysis [81]. Several open source and commercial
tools exist specically for the decompilation of binary code. For example, the popular Hex-
Rays plugin for IDA Pro reverses binary code to a C-like intermediate representation [39].
Dullien and Porst developed the Reverse Engineering Intermediate Language (REIL) for
their commercial product, Bindi [25].
None of these frameworks were appropriate for the goal of this work - focusing on security
vulnerabilities introduced by higher-level language constructs. They all focus on reversing
binary code to a C-like intermediate representation, thus leaving the IR at least one level
lower than the higher-level frameworks in focus in this work. The LLVM IR natively supports
the concept of object orientation. ReCall allows for the decompilation of objects into the
LLVM IR format, making them available to all of the higher-level analyses we developed.
Of course, this is not the only way to achieve higher-level context from binary code. Binary
data structure recovery has been studied for use in host-based intrusion prevention systems,
forensic analysis, and reverse engineering. For example, Dolan-Gavitt et al. [23] developed a
dynamic-analysis system that creates attack detection signatures by monitoring kernel data
structures in a way that is resistant to evasion. Similarly, Cozzie et al. developed Laika [20],
a system that uses Bayesian unsupervised learning to detect the presence of data structures
in memory indicative of a bot infection. Slowinska et al. [80] created a system that recovers
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data structures from a compiled binary for the purpose of reverse engineering.
This same problem exists for runtime analysis frameworks. Such tools either must be
instrumented into the application at compile time or interface with the compiled application
in its binary form. Because of this, the insertion points of the runtime framework have to
operate at a contextual layer lower than the security issues discussed in this work. Here
we present a runtime analysis framework that uses binary insertion to enforce security con-
straints on higher-level frameworks. Our runtime analysis framework, COMBlocker, allows
for the dynamic enforcement of COM objects by inserting itself into compiled binaries.
2.2 Source Code Analysis Frameworks
Software vulnerability detection systems have existed for many years. Lint, created in 1977,
has the ability to nd aws in the source code of C programs [46]. Lint-like systems have
been developed over the years for the analysis of C programs. For example, Sparse [82] is a
tool designed to nd aws in the Linux kernel. Splint [83] is the modern-day and maintained
version of Lint, and Clang [15] is a popular compiler with built-in static analysis capability.
Larochelle and Evans built upon these early works to statically detect the presence of buer
overow vulnerabilities in source code [48, 27]. Shankar et al. developed a system to statically
detect format string vulnerabilities [79]. ARCHER, a system developed by Xie, Chou, and
Engler, uses a constraint solver to determine the safety of array accesses [88]. Similarly,
Austin et al. created a system to detect pointer and array access errors [5]. Yet even with
all the work in this area, Heelan points out that these problems are still unsolved [38].
As simple buer overows and format string vulnerabilities became increasingly rare,
research focused on the detection of dynamic memory errors. Evans [29] and Bush et al. [10]
present diering approaches to the detection of dynamic memory errors. These concepts were
readily extended to the analysis of compiled C programs. Bugscam [9] is one of the oldest of
these types of binary scanning tools and has been used to discover hundreds of vulnerabilities
since its release. An entire industry has grown from these early tools: companies like Ounce
Labs (now part of IBM), Coverity, Fortify Software (now part of HP), and Veracode all oer
commercial products and services for the analysis of source code and compiled binaries.
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Indeed static code analysis frameworks focused on higher-level language constructs al-
ready exist, but in order to maintain the needed context, they operate on source code -
where context has not been lost by compilation. For example, research has been done in the
area of C++ object reconstruction [77], which relies on access to the source code or runtime
type information (RTTI). Additionally, Viega, et al. developed ITS4 [86]a vulnerability
scanner with support for C++. In this work, we reconstruct C++ objects from their com-
piled binary equivalent without access to any additional information. Many static analyses
have been integrated directly into popular compilers to provide developers with warnings
and errors as they are building their software. C++ analyses typically come in the form of
type-checking and checks for const-ness and volatility and are fully enumerated in the C++
standard [75]. Signicant research has attempted to extend required checks with virtual
function call resolution in C++ programs. Bacon and Sweeny [6], for example, developed
a static analysis algorithm to determine whether dynamic dispatch is truly necessary for a
given method call. In cases where it is not, it can be replaced with a static function call,
thus reducing the size of the compiled binary and the complexity of the program. Pande
and Ryder [74, 73] and Calder and Grunwald [12] continue this concept to eliminate late
binding where possible to take advantage of instruction pipelining on modern-day proces-
sors. SAFECode, a system developed by Dhurjati, Kowshik, and Adve [21] introduces a new
type system that can be enforced at compile-time to prevent several types of vulnerabilities.
2.3 High-Level Analyses
The concept of analyzing code for higher-level security issues is not unique to this work.
However, this work is unique in its application of high-level analyses to binary code, where it
was previously believed too much context had been lost. The following subsections describe
high-level analyses that are applied to source code.
2.3.1 Type Confusion Detection
SafeDispatch, developed by Jang, et al. analyzes source code for vtable escape
vulnerabilities[44]. The GCC compiler has recently been extended by Google [36] to enable
vtable verication. Microsoft also added extensions to Visual Studio for the runtime
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detection of vtable escape vulnerabilities [67]. While all of these techniques are interesting,
they only apply to new applications that are compiled with these tools enabled. They do
not apply to the myriad applications that are already deployed that were built without these
tools. Several tools have been developed to run during compilation to detect spatial safety
issues [5, 47].
2.3.2 Reference Counting
Reference counting [17, 76, 50] is a method for tracking the lifetime of an object. Concep-
tually, it keeps a counter for every usage of the object. Each time an application needs the
object, it increments the counter. When it is done with the object, it decrements the counter.
Objects should not be deleted until the counter is zero. Automatic Reference Counting [16] is
used extensively by Apple's Xcode development environment. In theory, reference counting
prevents the deletion of objects that are still in use, and use-after-free conditions. However,
as will be seen later in this dissertation, it is often implemented incorrectly resulting in
exploitable security issues.
2.3.3 Memory Safety
Many tools have been developed for the enforcement of memory safety. Many of these tools
insert additional checks into code before using memory-resident objects. Examples of such
tools are CCured [70, 69], Cyclone [45], Purify [37], and Deputy [18]. These tools often
require the developer to insert annotations in their code which can lead to missing vulner-
abilities. Additionally, like above, they only apply to new applications that are developed
with these toolsets. The work presented later in this dissertation shares many attributes
of dangling pointer analysis. Dhurjati and Adve propose a solution by which they allocate
an new virtual page of memory for each allocation [22]. In the attack that will be later
described in Chapter 6, we describe how memory reuse in a very specic way is required for
the exploitation of use-after-free conditions [78]. DieHard and DieHarder use randomization
to reduce the likelihood that these precise requirements can be met [8, 72].
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2.3.4 Control Flow Integrity
Control Flow Integrity (CFI) is one of the rst areas that garnered attention from the
research community. This was driven by the ease of exploitation and prevalence of stack
overow vulnerabilities. In short, the concept is to ensure that all code branches go to
a proper location [1]. Zhang, et al. showed that CFI can be implemented with minimal
runtime overhead [91]. Zeng, et. al showed how to introduce CFI using only static analysis
[90]. Zhang and Sekar then later showed how CFI could be enforced with a low-level reference
monitor [92]. Control Flow Integrity is an area of security that is inline with the low-level
analysis frameworks that are already in existence. In this work, we focus on security issues
that are introduced at much higher levels of context than CFI issues. However, in the face
of all of these solutions, it has been shown that dangling pointer issues can be exploited to
bypass CFI [14, 35].
2.3.5 Use-After-Free Detection
With binary code properly elevated to a higher-level context, we can now focus on higher-
level vulnerabilities. Use-after-free vulnerabilities are an example of one such case. Searching
specically for use-after-free vulnerabilities, Caballero, et al. developed Undangle [11]; a run-
time taint tracking tool used to detect dangling pointers. Also focused on dangling pointers,
Lee, et al. created DangNull[49] to nullify class pointers when objects are deleted. While
this is a sound solution to prevent exploitation of use-after-free vulnerabilities, it relies on
the application's pre-existing ability to handle null pointers, else it would introduce stability
problems [51]. Another example of C++specic vulnerabilities comes in the form of type
confusion. Tice [85] proposed a compile time solution to verify the validity of a virtual
function pointer before its invocation via inserting verication checks. Cling only allows for
memory reuse by objects of the same type [3]. The closest work to what is found in this
dissertation was done by Feist, et al. In their work [30], they use a memory model to detect
use-after-free conditions in binary code. They use a memory model based approach because
they focus on use-after-free conditions on primitive types.
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2.4 COM Security
At yet an even higher level of context, we have Microsoft's Component Object Model (COM),
and the ActiveX framework built on top of it. ActiveX has garnered signicant attention
from security experts over the past several years. Attacks against these controls range in
severity from downloading les to an adversary-supplied location to arbitrary code execu-
tion [60, 61, 57, 58, 62]. As a variety of vulnerabilities have been found in COM objects
included with the default installation of their operating systems, Microsoft has generally
prevented the exploitation of the objects by adding them to a blacklist intended to prevent
instantiation known as the killbit list. We previously demonstrated that it was possible
to bypass the killbit settings in Internet Explorer using a vulnerability for ActiveX con-
trols [24]. However, while this weakness was patched for Internet Explorer [63], the general
susceptibility of the COM architecture and applications relying upon it has not previously
been investigated.
The issue of securing the execution of content published by potentially untrusted third
parties is not unique to COM or Windows. Java applets, for example, expose a web browser
to similar classes of threats encountered by ActiveX [4, 53]. Security of Java applets has
been studied extensively with several solutions proposed to verify the publisher of the con-
tent and enforce access rights on the content as it executes. Jaeger, et al. [43] and Islam,
et al. [41] developed systems based on public key cryptography to verify the publisher of
dynamically downloadable executable content. They both then go on to propose solutions
for the enforcement of access controls on the code as it executes.
Security policies have been developed to address whether COM objects should be loaded
by Internet Explorer. The killbit list attempts to prevent the instantiation of known bad
controls [59]. As documented by Loscocco et al., ActiveX controls can be signed similar
to the way that was proposed for Java [52]. Additionally, ActiveX supports the concept of
Safe for Scripting [54]. This allows a control to tell Internet Explorer whether it can be
safely loaded by the script engine. Microsoft has implemented additional security policies
governing the instantiation of COM objects in other applications including the MS Oce
suite [66]. However, policies governing the instantiation of COM objects are implemented
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by the COM container itself.
Security retrots to well-established software infrastructures such as COM generally re-
quire signicant eort. A number of researchers have investigated the problem of retrotting
legacy systems with security infrastructure. These eorts use a range of approaches including
static analysis of code [13, 93, 71, 89, 31] and the monitoring of program behavior to deter-
mine security sensitive operations [42, 34]. The work by Ganapathy, et al. demonstrates the
injection of authorization policy enforcement code into existing legacy applications including
web and proxy servers [33] and the Linux Security Module infrastructure [32]. Fraser, et
al. perform a similar deployment of authorization hooks in MINIX [31]. This builds on the
concept of inlined reference monitoring as described by Bauer, et al. [7], Erlingsson [26], and
Evans and Twyman [28]. Each of these demonstrates how an existing application can be
modied to perform functions not originally designed into the code. The closed nature of
the COM architecture requires that our solution rely on binary rewriting techniques rather
than those used on source code.
Each of the vulnerability classes discussed in this work is introduced into an application
from a higher-level language construct or framework. The elevation of context from the
binary level to one commensurate with the language or framework in question is required




3.1 Complex Types Built on a Primitive Language
The security issues described throughout this dissertation all have one thing in common 
they are issues present in higher-level language constructs that are built on top of a primitive
language (in this case, C). In many ways, the overlay of these complex concepts on top of
a primitive language is the cause of the security issues. By building complex datatypes
on top of a primitive language, there is no opportunity for type verication which leads to
problems like type confusion as described in Chapter 5. Since C does not natively provide for
reference counting of variables, the only method for self-policing the allocation of memory
is by tracking scope. This is insucient for object-oriented programming where objects
most often must live beyond the scope of a single function. With that, memory allocation
and reference counting are implemented on top of the primitive language and allow for
opportunities to make mistakes. This leads to conditions like memory leaks, use-after-free
conditions, and null pointer dereferences. To better understand the low-level details of the
complex types we will be exploring, the following section cover how objects are created,
used, and deleted in C++, and how COM objects span the same lifecycle.
3.2 C++ Background
3.2.1 Dening a Class
C++ builds on the C struct data type. It allows developers to create class denitions
by adding additional functionality to what is traditionally oered in a struct. A short
summary of the additions to the C struct are enumerated below:
1. Namespaces - Namespaces allow a developer to avoid naming collisions by speci-
fying a higher-level scope for each variable declaration. Namespaces can be dened
by using the namespace keyword, but are also implicitly dened by a class deni-
tion. For example consider the code below. Here we can see three declarations of
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the variable referenceCount and two declarations of the type Class1. Namespaces
allow the developer to disambiguate between all of these denitions. In this example,
example::Class1 is dierent than Class1, and example::Class1::referenceCount,










Figure 1: Example use of namespaces
2. Constructors - A constructor is a function that is automatically called when an object
is instantiated. The constructor is dened by creating a function of the same name
of the class type. For example, consider the code below. Here we can see and object
of type Class1 the constructor is dened as the method named Class1::Class1().





Class1 :: Class1 ()
{
//do all of the object initialization here
}
Figure 2: Example constructor declaration
3. Destructors - Destructors are the counterpart to constructors. This is where a
developer would insert code that is necessary to clean up just prior to an object being
deleted. Destructors are specied by declaring an object method with the same name
as the class and prefacing the name with a tilde (~). An example of a destructor can





Class1 :: Class1 ()
{
//do all of the object initialization here
}
Class1 ::~ Class1 ()
{
//do any object clean up here
}
Figure 3: Example destructor declaration
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4. Inheritance - Inheritance allows a class to adopt the properties and methods of a
parent class. In the code below, the developer has declared a class of type Class1.
Then, a second class of type Class2 has been declared that inherits from Class1.
With this inheritance, Class2 will have a class method named Method1() in addition









Figure 4: Example of inheritance
5. public and private Operators - C++ oers the public and private keywords in
class denitions. These keywords declare which properties and methods are accessible
from anywhere in the program, and those that are only accessible from within the class
itself. In the code example below, Class1 has a public method named PublicMethod()
and a public property called publicProperty. In these cases, from anywhere in a
program, a developer can directly call PublicMethod() on an instance of the object.
Additionally, the developer could directly access the property publicProperty. The
code in Figure 6 shows a case where a developer has instantiated an object of type
Class1 called my_class1. Here we can see a call to the public method and an access
to the public property. On the contrary, the code in Figure 7 shows similar code where
the develop attempts to access a private method and private property. This code will
fail compilation with an error. The code in Figure 8 shows how the private methods
and properties can be accessed from within the class itself. It is important to note that
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the enforcement of public and private is a compile-time check. There is no runtime












Figure 5: Examples of use of public and private keywords




int local_var = my_class1.publicProperty;
}
Figure 6: Examples of accessing public properties and methods
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int local_var = my_class1.privateProperty;
}
Figure 7: Examples of attempting to access private methods and properties. This code will
















Figure 8: Examples of properly accessing private methods and properties.
6. virtual Operator - The virtual keyword is what declares a class method as being
overridable. In the code below we see a case where a class of type Class2 inherits






virtual int Method2 ();
};




Figure 9: Examples of virtual methods
3.2.2 Object Lifetime
3.2.2.1 Creating an Object
There are two ways for a developer to instantiate an object. The rst is to declare the object
as a stack variable just as any other type of variable. For example, the code in Figure 10
shows three variables declared on the stack: an integer, a character array length 32, and an
object of type class1. For this code to be valid, class1 would have to be dened as shown
in Figure 2.







Figure 10: Example of stack-declared variables
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When an object is declared on the stack, the class constructor is called immediately
upon declaration.
The second way to instantiate an object is to declare the object on the heap. To do this,
a developer uses the new operator. Behind the scenes, new automatically allocates enough
memory to store the object. The exact structure of what is contained in memory is covered in
detail in Section 3.2.3. The implied memory allocation occurs through a call to a compiler-
inserted function called YAPAXI(). This is basically just a wrapper for malloc(). After
allocating the proper amount of memory, new automatically calls the object's constructor
passing the pointer returned from YAPAXI() as the this pointer. The return from the
constructor is the same this pointer, but now it points to a complete object. Much like the
use of malloc(), it is up to the developer to manually free the memory used by the object
after it is no longer in use. There is no implicit deletion like in the case of a stack-declared
object.
3.2.2.2 Deleting an Object
In the case of a stack-declared object, the object is automatically deleted, and the destructor
is implicitly called when the variable goes out of scope. In the case of a heap-declared object,
the developer must manually delete the object when it is no longer needed. This is done
by using the delete operator. Behind the scenes, the compiler inserts a call to the object's
destructor and frees the allocated memory. To free the memory, the compiler inserts a call
to a function called YAXPAX(). This is basically just a wrapper for free(). Because freeing
the object is at the discretion of the developer, one can envision how memory leaks and use-
after-free conditions may occur. Use-after-free conditions are covered in detail in Chapter
6.
3.2.3 Structure of an Object After Compilation
An important distinction is how methods are inserted into the code when they are declared
virtual and when they are not. When a method is not declared virtual, calls to that method
are dispatched exactly the same way that function calls are made in C. For example, consider






















.text:00401120 wmain proc near
.text:00401120
.text:00401120 var_1C = byte ptr -1Ch
.text:00401120 var_14 = dword ptr -14h
.text:00401120 var_10 = byte ptr -10h
.text:00401120 var_C = dword ptr -0Ch
.text:00401120 var_4 = dword ptr -4
.text:00401120
.text:00401120 push ebp
.text:00401121 mov ebp, esp
.text:00401123 push 0FFFFFFFFh
.text:00401125 push offset loc_401B30
.text:0040112A mov eax, large fs:0
.text:00401130 push eax
.text:00401131 sub esp, 10h
.text:00401134 mov eax, __security_cookie
.text:00401139 xor eax, ebp
.text:0040113B push eax
.text:0040113C lea eax, [ebp+var_C]
.text:0040113F mov large fs:0, eax
.text:00401145 lea ecx, [ebp+var_1C]
.text:00401148 call class1__class1
.text:0040114D mov [ebp+var_4], 0
.text:00401154 lea ecx, [ebp+var_10]
.text:00401157 call class2__class2
.text:0040115C mov byte ptr [ebp+var_4], 1
.text:00401160 lea ecx, [ebp+var_1C]
.text:00401163 call class1__print
.text:00401168 lea ecx, [ebp+var_10]
.text:0040116B call class2__print
.text:00401170 mov [ebp+var_14], 0
.text:00401177 mov byte ptr [ebp+var_4], 0
.text:0040117B lea ecx, [ebp+var_10]
.text:0040117E call class2___class2
.text:00401183 mov [ebp+var_4], 0FFFFFFFFh
.text:0040118A lea ecx, [ebp+var_1C]
.text:0040118D call class1___class1
.text:00401192 mov eax, [ebp+var_14]
.text:00401195 mov ecx, [ebp+var_C]
.text:00401198 mov large fs:0, ecx
.text:0040119F pop ecx





Figure 11: Example use of non-virtual class methods
version of the code. In the source code, we can see a call to the class method print() at
line 18, we can see this is simply translated into a normal call in the compiled code (the call
is located at line 0x401163). The only dierence between this call, and a standard C call is
the calling convention. Specically, in C++, the this pointer for the object is automatically
passed to the method in the ecx register.
In the case of methods that are declared virtual, a table of function pointers is created.
One function pointer is included for each virtual function declared in the class. This table
 known as the vtable  contains a function pointer for each virtual function in the order in
which they are declared. A pointer to the vtable is stored as the rst element in the object's
structure in memory. This layout can been seen in more detail in Figure 12. When a call
is made to a virtual function, the vtable is consulted to nd the location of the associated
function. It is this method of dynamic dispatch that allows classes to override method
denitions of parent classes. When a class overrides a method, the compiler inserts the child



















cout << “I’m in 














Figure 12: Memory layout of a C++ object after compilation
Consider the code in Figure 13a. This is very similar to the code we used in the non-
virtual example. However, in this case, a call is made to the virtual method debug(). In
the corresponding binary in Figure 13b, we can see a call to a dereferenced pointer at line




COM is an architectural standard that mandates a language agnostic representation of
objects, and facilitates interaction between these objects. Microsoft uses COM as a funda-
mental building block in many of their premier technologies. It is pervasive in their agship
Windows Operating System, and also utilized extensively by many other peripheral prod-
ucts, such as Internet Explorer and Oce. In the rst section entitled Variants, we will
discuss the fundamental, language agnostic data types that COM uses to communicate and
the APIs used to manipulate them. Variants will be explored in order to provide the reader
with more context for the types of vulnerabilities that are the focus of this work. Following
variants is a section entitled COM Automation, which discusses the subset of COM objects
that can be readily exposed to scripting runtime environments, collectively known as Ac-























.text:00401120 wmain proc near
.text:00401120
.text:00401120 var_20 = byte ptr -20h
.text:00401120 var_18 = dword ptr -18h
.text:00401120 var_14 = dword ptr -14h
.text:00401120 var_10 = byte ptr -10h
.text:00401120 var_C = dword ptr -0Ch
.text:00401120 var_4 = dword ptr -4
.text:00401120
.text:00401120 push ebp
.text:00401121 mov ebp, esp
.text:00401123 push 0FFFFFFFFh
.text:00401125 push offset loc_401B40
.text:0040112A mov eax, large fs:0
.text:00401130 push eax
.text:00401131 sub esp, 14h
.text:00401134 mov eax, __security_cookie
.text:00401139 xor eax, ebp
.text:0040113B push eax
.text:0040113C lea eax, [ebp+var_C]
.text:0040113F mov large fs:0, eax
.text:00401145 lea ecx, [ebp+var_20]
.text:00401148 call class1__class1
.text:0040114D mov [ebp+var_4], 0
.text:00401154 lea ecx, [ebp+var_10]
.text:00401157 call class2__class2
.text:0040115C mov byte ptr [ebp+var_4], 1
.text:00401160 lea eax, [ebp+var_10]
.text:00401163 mov [ebp+var_18], eax
.text:00401166 lea ecx, [ebp+var_20]
.text:00401169 call class1__print
.text:0040116E lea ecx, [ebp+var_10]
.text:00401171 call class2__print
.text:00401173 lea eax, [ebp+var_20]
.text:00401176 lea ecx, [ebp+var_20]
.text:00401179 call dword ptr [eax+0ch]
.text:0040117E mov [ebp+var_14], 0
.text:00401185 mov byte ptr [ebp+var_4], 0
.text:00401189 lea ecx, [ebp+var_10]
.text:0040118C call class2___class2
.text:00401191 mov [ebp+var_4], 0FFFFFFFFh
.text:00401198 lea ecx, [ebp+var_20]
.text:0040119B call class1___class1
.text:004011A0 mov eax, [ebp+var_14]
.text:004011A3 mov ecx, [ebp+var_C]
.text:004011A6 mov large fs:0, ecx
.text:004011AD pop ecx

































Figure 14: Type denition for __tagVARIANT
the concept of persistence - the ability to serialize the current state of a COM object and
subsequently resurrect that object at a later time. The use of persistence will be explored in
the context of potentially hostile environments, where the serialized objects may originate
from untrusted sources (such as malicious web pages or oce documents).
3.3.1.1 Variants
VARIANTs are one of the key data structures utilized throughout the Windows platform for
representing arbitrary data types in a standardized format. In particular, they are an integral
part of COM, and are employed to exchange data between two or more communicating
objects. The VARIANT data structure is a relatively simple one  it is composed of a type
and a value, and is dened in OAIdl.h in the Windows SDK as shown in Figure 14.
The value contained by a VARIANT can be one of a variety of dierent types, and so only
has meaning when given context by the vt member, which indicates the type. There are
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Table 1: VARIANT Basic Types
Type Name Value Union Contains
VT_EMPTY 0x0000 Undened
VT_NULL 0x0001 NULL value
VT_I2 0x0002 Signed (2-byte) short
VT_I4 0x0003 Signed (4-byte) integer
VT_R4 0x0004 Signed (4-byte) real (oat)
VT_R8 0x0005 Signed large (8-byte) real (double)
VT_BSTR 0x0008 String; Pointer to a BSTR
VT_DISPATCH 0x0009 Pointer to an IDispatch interface
(automation object)
VT_ERROR 0x000A Error code (4-byte integer)
VT_BOOL 0x000B Boolean (2-byte short)
VT_VARIANT 0x000C Pointer to another VARIANT
VT_UNKNOWN 0x000D Pointer to an IUnknown interface (any COM
object)
VT_I1 0x0010 Signed (1-byte) char
VT_UI1 0x0011 Unsigned (1-byte) char
VT_UI2 0x0012 Unsigned (2-byte) short
VT_UI4 0x0013 Unsigned (4-byte) integer
VT_RECORD 0x0024 Pointer to an IRecordInfo interface (used to
represent user-dened data types)
quite a large number of basic types that can be represented by a VARIANT. Some of the more
common ones are shown in Table ??.
As can be seen in Table ??, all of the basic data types can be represented as a variant,
in addition to a variety of COM interface types such as IUnknown and IDispatch interfaces.
Furthermore, user-dened types are supported through the use of the IRecordInfo COM
interface. This interface provides functions to dene custom object sizes and marshallers so
that any arbitrary data structure can be represented. The listed types are only a subset of
all the supported VARIANT types. A complete list of all of the available types can be found
in wtypes.h located within the Windows SDK. In addition to basic variant types, there are
several modiers that, when used in conjunction with a basic type, alter the meaning of
what is contained within the __VARIANT_NAME_1 union. Modiers cannot be used on their
own; they are specically designed to provide additional context to a basic type. They are
used by combining the modier value (or values) with that of the basic type. The modiers
and their respective meanings are summarized in Table 2.
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Table 2: VARIANT Modier Types
Modier Name Modier Value Value
VT_VECTOR 0x1000 Value points to a simple counted array
(Rarely used)
VT_ARRAY 0x2000 Value points to a SAFEARRAY structure
VT_BYREF 0x4000 Value points to base type, instead of
containing a literal of the base type
As can be seen in the tables, basic types are all below 0x0FFF, and modiers are single-
bit values larger than 0x0FFF. So, by augmenting a basic type with a modier using simple
bit-masking operations, a new, complex type is formed. For example, a VARIANT containing
an array of strings would have the type VT_ARRAY|VT_BSTR, and the value member would
point to a SAFEARRAY where each member was a BSTR. (SAFEARRAYs will be examined in more
depth momentarily.) A VARIANT could represent a pointer to a signed integer by having the
type VT_BYREF|VT_I4. The VT_BYREF modier may also be used in conjunction with one of
the other modiers, so a VARIANT could have the type (VT_BYREF|VT_ARRAY|VT_BSTR). In
this case, the value member would point to a SAFEARRAY pointer, whose members are all of
type BSTR.
3.3.1.2 Safe Arrays
Arrays are a common data construct utilized by COM, and are present in VARIANTs that
contain the VT_ARRAYmodier in the vt eld. In this case, a SAFEARRAY is used to encapsulate
a series of elements of the same data type, and can be manipulated through the SafeArray
API for safely accessing the members of the array without needing to worry about boundaries
and other administrative problems associated with array access. Although they are most
often used to represent an array with just a single dimension, SAFEARRAYs are also capable of
representing mulch-dimensional arrays of potentially diering dimension sizes (often referred
to as jagged arrays). The SAFEARRAY structure denition is dened in OAIdl.h in the
Windows SDK, and is shown below.
Elements contained within a SAFEARRAY are cbElements in size, and are stored contigu-
ously in an area of memory, pointed to by the pvData member. An array of SAFEARRAYBOUND
structures follows the SAFEARRAY descriptor in memory, with each SAFEARRAYBOUND structure
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SAFEARRAYBOUND rgsabound[ 1 ];
} SAFEARRAY;
Figure 15: Type denition for tagSAFEARRAY




Figure 16: Type denition for tagSAFEARRAYBOUND
describing a single dimension of the array. The SAFEARRAYBOUND structure is constructed as
follows:
Simply put, the lLbound member indicates the lower bound of the described dimension,
and the cElements member indicates how many members exist within that dimension. The
SAFEARRAY API is relatively extensive, so we will consider the most common API functions
required for manipulation of these structures. The rst two functions are for initialization
and destruction, and are the complement of each other:
SAFEARRAY *SafeArrayCreate(VARTYPE vt,
UINT cDims , SAFEARRAYBOUND * rgsabound );
HRESULT SafeArrayDestroy(SAFEARRAY * psa);
These functions are used to create and destroy an array respectively. When the array
is created, the data type of each array member is designated, as well as the number of the
dimensions of the array. These properties are both immutable; a SAFEARRAY's type and
number of dimensions cannot be modied after creation. There are two dierent ways of
accessing data in arrays. The rst way is to get a pointer to the memory where all of the
elements reside, and is done using the following functions:
HRESULT SafeArrayAccessData(SAFEARRAY * psa ,
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void HUGEP** ppvData );
HRESULT SafeArrayUnaccessData(SAFEARRAY * psa);
This is often the preferred method when accessing elements in a loop, in the form:
BSTR *pString;
if(FAILED(SafeArrayAccessData(psa , &pString ))
return -1;
for(i = 0; i < psa ->rgsabound [0]. cElements; i++) {
... operate on string ...
}
SafeArrayUnaccessData(psa);
The second way to access data is by accessing an individual element using the following
functions:
SafeArrayGetElement(SAFEARRAY * psa , LONG * rgIndices ,
void * pv);
SafeArrayPutElement(SAFEARRAY * psa , LONG * rgIndices ,
void * pv);
Each of these functions takes an array of indices and will either return or store the
specic value in question. Note that internally, both functions verify the validity of the
supplied indices to ensure that each array access is within bounds. Lastly, we should mention
that SAFEARRAYs have locking mechanisms to ensure exclusive thread access to array data,
accessed by the following two functions:
HRESULT SafeArrayLock(SAFEARRAY * psa);
HRESULT SafeArrayUnlock(SAFEARRAY * psa);
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3.3.1.3 VARIANT versus VARIANTARG
Many of the VARIANT API functions take either a VARIANT or a VARIANTARG. Microsoft
documentation suggests that the dierence between these two values is that VARIANTs always
contain direct values (i.e., they can't have the modier VT_BYREF), whereas VARIANTARGs can.
In fact, you will notice in the discussion of the VARIANT API further on that most of the
Variant* functions take VARIANTARGs. In reality, these structures are actually equivalent
and can be used interchangeably despite documentation indicating otherwise. Furthermore,
a compiler error is not generated when they are used interchangeably.
3.3.1.4 VARIANT API
The API for manipulating VARIANTs is quite extensive, however only a few of the functions
are relevant for the purposes of this dissertation, and they are discussed in this section.
3.3.1.5 Variant Initialization and Destruction
VARIANTs are initialized using the VariantInit() function, which has the following proto-
type:
HRESULT VariantInit(VARIANTARG *pvarg);
This function does nothing except to set the type member of the VARIANT, vt, to
VT_EMPTY, indicating that the VARIANT holds no value. The VARIANT is later cleaned up
using the reciprocal function VariantClear():
HRESULT VariantClear(VARIANTARG *pvarg);
The VariantClear() function will also clear the vt member, as well as free any data as-
sociated with the VARIANT. For example, if the VARIANT contains an IDispatch or IUnknown
interface (type VT_DISPATCH or VT_UNKNOWN respectively), then the interface will be released
by VariantClear(). If the VARIANT is a string (VT_BSTR), it will be de-allocated, and so on.
3.3.1.6 Variant Manipulation
The two primary types of operations one may perform on a VARIANT using the API are
conversion and duplication. There are a large variety of specic conversion functions of the
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HRESULT VariantCopy(VARIANTARG *pvargDest ,
VARIANTARG *pvargSrc );
HRESULT VariantCopyInd(VARIANTARG *pvargDest ,
VARIANTARG *pvargSrc );
form VarXXFromYY(), where XX is the destination VARIANT type and YY is the source type.
There are also generic functions for converting between any two VARIANT types, which are
shown below.
HRESULT VariantChangeType(VARIANTARG *pvargDest ,
VARIANTARG *pvargSrc , unsigned short wFlags , VARTYPE vt);
HRESULT VariantChangeTypeEx(VARIANTARG *pvargDest ,
VARIANTARG *pvargSrc , LCID lcid ,
unsigned short wFlags , VARTYPE vt);
These two functions both perform essentially the same task  converting pvargSrc to
the type specied by vt, and placing the result in pvargDest. The other functions worth
mentioning are those responsible for copying a VARIANT value from one VARIANT to another:
These functions both clear the destination VARIANT, and then copy in the source VARIANT.
They do a deep copy; that is, if a COM interface is copied, the reference count is incremented,
and so on. The dierence between the two functions is that VariantCopyInd() will follow
an indirect reference for a copy (i.e., if the VARIANT has the VT_BYREF modier, the value will
be dereferenced and then modied), whereas VariantCopy() will not. VariantCopyInd()
is also recursive; if a VARIANT is received that has the type (VT_BYREF|VT_VARIANT), the
destination VARIANT will be examined further. If it is also a (VT_BYREF|VT_VARIANT), an
error is signaled. If it has a VT_BYREF modier but is not a VT_VARIANT, this VARIANT will
be passed to VariantCopyInd() again, thus retrieving the value being stored.
3.3.1.7 COM Automation
As mentioned previously, COM Automation facilitates the integration of pluggable com-
ponents into scripting environments. This is primarily achieved by creating objects that
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/*** IDispatch methods ***/
HRESULT (STDMETHODCALLTYPE *GetTypeInfoCount )( IDispatch* This ,
UINT* pctinfo );
HRESULT (STDMETHODCALLTYPE *GetTypeInfo )( IDispatch* This , UINT iTInfo ,
LCID lcid , ITypeInfo ** ppTInfo );
HRESULT (STDMETHODCALLTYPE *GetIDsOfNames )( IDispatch* This , REFIID riid ,
LPOLESTR* rgszNames , UINT cNames , LCID lcid , DISPID* rgDispId );
HRESULT (STDMETHODCALLTYPE *Invoke )( IDispatch* This , DISPID dispIdMember ,
REFIID riid , LCID lcid , WORD wFlags , DISPPARAMS* pDispParams ,
VARIANT* pVarResult , EXCEPINFO* pExcepInfo , UINT* puArgErr );
Figure 17: List of IDispatch methods
implement one or both of the automation interfaces: IDispatch and IDispatchEx. The
IDispatch interface exposes functions that are designed to achieve the following directives:
1. Allow an object to be self-publishing (i.e., advertise its properties and methods)
2. Allow methods to be called or properties to be manipulated by name, rather than
direct vtable / memory manipulation.
3. Provide a unied marshaling interface for objects being passed to methods or proper-
ties, as well as objects being returned to the scripting host.
By implementing IDispatch, objects can be loaded at runtime by a host application and
subsequently manipulated without the host having to know any compile time details about
the objects it is. This capability is particularly useful for scripting interfaces which re-
quire extensibility. The IDispatch interface is derived from IUnknown (both documented at
MSDN), adding four methods as shown:
If an application would like to call any of the methods or modify any of the properties
exposed by the object, it rst needs to determine the dispatch ID associated with the
method it would like to call. To determine this information, the application rst needs to
call GetIdsOfNames(). The return value is an integer that maps to the actual method that
will be executed through the Invoke() method. The Invoke() method takes the ID of the
member to be executed, the arguments to the method, and some other information about
locale, etc as arguments. The wFlags argument passed to Invoke() denes whether the
dispatch ID references a method exposed by the object or a property value that it should
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typedef struct FARSTRUCT tagDISPPARAMS{
VARIANTARG FAR* rgvarg; // Array of arguments.
DISPID FAR* rgdispidNamedArgs; // Dispatch IDs of named arguments.
unsigned int cArgs; // Number of arguments.
unsigned int cNamedArgs; // Number of named arguments.
} DISPPARAMS;
Figure 18: Type denition for tagDISPPARAMS
either get or set. The arguments to the method that will be executed are passed in a
DISPPARAMS structure. The DISPPARAMS structure is dened below:
As you can see, this structure passes the arguments to the method in an array of VARIANTs
(See the section on VARIANTs for more detail). This array must be unmarshalled by the called
method. In some cases, this can be a bit of a daunting task given the complexity of some of
the VARIANT types that may be present in the array. The IDispatch interface is useful for
creating automation objects whose behavior is immutable - the properties and methods must
be known at compile time and they don't change. However, in some cases, it is desirable to
have objects whose behavior could be modied at runtime, and the IDispatchEx interface
extends IDispatch to allow this additional functionality. With IDispatchEx objects, it is
possible to add or remove properties or methods at runtime. This is functionality that is
commonly required by more dynamic late-bound languages such as scripting languages (e.g.
JavaScript). The IDispatchEx interface is also derived from the IUnknown interface, adding
eight methods as follows:
HRESULT DeleteMemberByDispID( DISPID id );
HRESULT DeleteMemberByName( BSTR bstrName ,
DWORD grfdex );
HRESULT GetDispID( BSTR bstrName ,
DWORD grfdex , DISPID *pid );
HRESULT GetMemberName( DISPID id,
BSTR *pbstrName );
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HRESULT GetMemberProperties( DISPID id,
DWORD grfdexFetch , DWORD *pgrfdex );
HRESULT GetNameSpaceParent( IUnknown **ppunk );
HRESULT GetNextDispID( DWORD grfdex ,
DISPID id, DISPID *pid );
HRESULT InvokeEx( DISPID id, LCID lcid ,
WORD wFlags , DISPARAMS *pdp ,
VARIANT *pVarRes , EXCEPINFO *pei ,
IServiceProvider *pspCaller );
While there are some dierences in the way dispatch IDs are retrieved, the main changes
to IDispatchEx are those that allow for the creation and deletion of object properties and
methods. GetDispID(), for example, diers from GetIdsOfNames() in that it can be told to
create a new name and dispatch ID for a new property or method. Additionally, you can see
the methods DeleteMemberByName() and DeleteMemberByDispID() have been added. In
ActiveX controls that extend the IDispatchEx interface, the dynamic creation and deletion
of members is accessible through JavaScript. Interestingly, JavaScript (for Internet Explorer)
itself is implemented using a modied IDispatchEx interface exposed by the Microsoft script
engine. Conceptually, this implementation makes sense because JavaScript will need to be
able to create objects and add and delete members all without any preconceived notion of
what the object may look like. So, for example, when JavaScript creates a new object:
obj = new Object ();
Internet Explorer will rst call the GetDispID() method for Obj  ensuring the
fdexNameEnsure ag is set to create the member. It will then call its own internal version
of Invoke() to call the Object() method. The value returned from the call to Invoke()
will then become assigned to the obj member.
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Figure 19: Diagram representing various media that can contain the IStream data.
3.3.1.8 COM Persistence Overview
COM provides two primary interfaces for manipulating an object's persistence data. The
rst interface, IStream, represents a data stream that is used to store a single object's
persisted data. It supports standard le operations including reading, writing, and seeking
using the interface methods. The IStream interface abstracts the underlying storage details
from the consumer of the stream. This abstraction allows for COM objects to implement
serialization functionality without explicit knowledge of the underlying backing store. This
abstraction is visually depicted in Figure 19.
The second interface, IStorage, is employed when a program or COM object requires
the persistence of multiple objects. IStorage represents a storage le, which can hold
logically separate binary streams inside a single le using unique names to identify each
stream. Additionally, a storage le can contain logically separate subordinate storage les,
also accessed by unique names, thus allowing for recursion if it is required. The IStorage
interface provides methods that allow the programmer to access each of the constituent
streams and subordinate storage les. Figure 20 depicts an example of a typical storage le.
In addition to IStream and IStorage, there are several other interfaces that can be used
for manipulating COM persistence data, depending on the medium that contains the data.




Figure 20: An example of a storage le's contents.
MIDL_INTERFACE ("0000010c-0000 -0000 -C000 -000000000046")
Persist : public IUnknown
{
public:
virtual HRESULT STDMETHODCALLTYPE GetClassID(




COM objects support serialization by implementing one of several well-known persistence
interfaces. Each of these persistence interfaces are specializations of the IPersist interface,
which has the following denition:
Each subclass of IPersist has methods named Load() and Save(), which serialize the
data and resurrect the data, respectively. The dierentiator between these subclasses is the
type of interface that holds the persisted data. Table ?? lists the persistence interfaces, and
the argument type that each respective interface uses to hold the data. Figure 21 visually
depicts the inheritance hierarchy of these interfaces.
When a host program wishes to serialize an object, it will query that object for a per-
sistence interface. If successful, the application will then call the Save() method, passing
a pointer to one of the previously-discussed storage interfaces (IStream, IStorage, IFile,
etc). Later, when a host program wishes to resurrect the object from its persistent state, it
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Table 3: Persistence Interfaces correlated to Data Interfaces
Persistence Interface Argument that Holds the Data
IPersistFile An LPCOLESTR that designates a standard le path
IPersistMemory An LPVOID that is a xed-size memory buer
IPersistMoniker An IMoniker interface
IPersistPropertyBag An IPropertyBag interface
IPersistPropertyBag2 An IPropertyBag2 interface
IPersistStorage An IStorage interface
IPersistStream An IStream interface
IPersistStreamInit An LPSTREAM interface
will once again retrieve the object's persistence interface, and call the Load() method. The
object resurrected from the persistence data should be equivalent to the object that was
previously saved.
3.3.1.9 Implementing COM Persistence in the ATL
Developers of COM objects are free to implement their own persistence interfaces. If these
developers choose to write their own code for the interface, they would manipulate the
interface that stores the persistence data by reading and writing data in an arbitrary format.
However, most developers choose to use template classes provided in the Microsoft ATL,
when there is template code to do so, avoiding the extra work it would require to implement






The template code requires a programmer to dene a series of properties, known as a prop-
erty map, which the persistence interface will use as a boiler plate for serializing and resur-
recting the object in question. This property map is a terminated array of structures that
list the properties for the control that must be serialized and resurrected, and should be
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Figure 21: The inheritance hierarchy of persistence interfaces.
made explicit enough to guarantee that the object, once serialized, will be equivalent to an
object that is resurrected from the data. Version nine of the ATL includes various macros























Each of the previously mentioned macro functions take various arguments and use them
to dene an ATL_PROPMAP_ENTRY structure. The following code is the structure denition
taken from version nine of the ATL.
The elements in the ATL_PROPMAP_ENTRY structure are all quite important to understand,
and are summarized in Table ??.
The macro functions for dening properties use arguments supplied to the function to
set certain ATL_PROPMAP_ENTRY elements, and will set others to a default state. Depend-
ing on the elements that have non-default values, the template code responsible for the
persistence operations will use slightly diering strategies when serializing and resurrecting
the data. Both BEGIN_PROPERTY_MAP and BEGIN_PROP_MAP will include code that starts
to dene the structure; however, the former will automatically include X and Y position
information within the property map. END_PROP_MAP and END_PROPERTY_MAP are macro
functions that will include a terminating ATL_PROPMAP_ENTRY element and end the struc-
ture denition. Between BEGIN_PROPERTY_MAP or BEGIN_PROP_MAP, and END_PROP_MAP or
END_PROPERTY_MAP, are ATL_PROPMAP_ENTRY instances that describe the properties of a COM
object. PROP_ENTRY and PROP_ENTRY_EX both dene a property using the property's name,
display id, and a property page that can be used to set the property. PROP_ENTRY_TYPE
and PROP_ENTRY_TYPE_EX dene the same information as PROP_ENTRY and PROP_ENTRY_EX;
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Table 4: A listing of the elements of the ATL_PROPMAP_ENTRY structure and the
purpose they serve.
Element Name Element Purpose
szDesc Unicode string that uniquely identies the
property name
dispid 32-bit integer that uniquely identies the
property within the object
pclsidPropPage Pointer to a COM class id that identies a
COM class that oers a GUI interface to set
and retrieve the property within the control
piidDispatch Pointer to a COM interface id that describes
an interface that inherits from IDispatch,
which can be used to set the property
through the Invoke method of the interface
dwOffsetData 32-bit value that species the property's
memory oset from the beginning of the
object
dwSizeData 32-bit value that species the number of
bytes that have been allocated in the object
to hold the property's data
vt 16-bit value that species the property's type
however they also require an explicit variant type that is expected when dealing with the
property. The _EX sux designates that the macro function also expects an explicit dis-
patch interface id that should be used when setting or getting the property's value. The
PROP_DATA_ENTRY macro requires a unique string identier for the property, the name of the
class's member that will be used to store the property, and the type of variant that's ex-
pected for the property. Internally, the PROP_DATA_ENTRY macro uses the osetof and sizeof
structure to explicitly dene dwOffsetData and dwSizeData within the ATL_PROPMAP_ENTRY
structure. PROP_PAGE is used to specify a COM class id that oers a GUI interface, which
can manipulate the properties of an object. To help illustrate the use of property maps in
C code and how properties are read from a persisted state, we'll briey present an example
COM object called HelloCom. HelloCom is a simple ActiveX control that can store a per-
son's rst and last names. The properties will have the names NameFirst and NameLast.
The following C++ code snippet shows portions of code for the HelloCom control that are
relevant for implementing persistence.
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class HelloCom :
public IPersistStreamInitImpl <HelloCom >,
public IPersistStorageImpl <HelloCom >,




PROP_DATA_ENTRY ("_cx", m_sizeExtent.cx, VT_UI4)
PROP_DATA_ENTRY ("_cy", m_sizeExtent.cy, VT_UI4)
PROP_ENTRY (" NameFirst", 1, CLSID_HelloComCtrl)
PROP_ENTRY_TYPE (" NameLast", 2, CLSID_HelloComCtrl , VT_BSTR)
END_PROP_MAP ()
};
Figure 23: Class denition for HelloCom
If the application is loading the persistence data from a binary stream, then the applica-
tion would query for the IPersistStreamInit interface and would receive a vtable pointing
to the IPersistStreamInitImpl template class. Next, the application will call the Load()
method, passing in an IStream object that will be used to read the persistence data. Prior
to any of the serialized data in a stream, a version number is stored in order to deal with
backwards compatibility issues. So, the rst four bytes in the stream will be a little-endian
representation of the ATL version that was used to compile the control. In Visual Studio
2008, this value is 0x00000900. As long as the value is less-than or equal-to the version of
the ATL used to compile the control, processing can resume, otherwise, an error is signaled.
After the versioning information has been processed, the properties themselves can then be
retrieved from the stream. The bytes immediately after the version number in the stream
in this case would be two 4-byte little-endian representations of the _cx and _cy elements.
Since these elements were declared with the PROP_DATA_ENTRY macro, these 32-bit values
will be written directly to the memory oset in the class where the m_sizeExtent.cx and
m_sizeExtent.cy values reside. Following these values, we will encounter the serialized
representation of NameFirst. Since NameFirst is declared in the property map using the
PROP_ENTRY() macro, which contains no data type, the type information needs to be re-
trieved from the stream. Therefore, the rst two bytes in the stream would be an unsigned
16-bit value of 0x0008, representing the variant type VT_BSTR. Next would come an un-
signed 32-bit value specifying the length of the string. If the name were "Example", then
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Oset Hexadecimal representation of bytes Description
0x00 00 09 00 00 Version nine of the ATL
0x04 00 01 00 00 The _cx value is 256
0x08 00 01 00 00 The _cy value is 256
0x0C 08 00 NameFirst is stored as a VT_BSTR
0x0E 0C 00 00 00 NameFirst is 12 characters long
0x12 46 00 69 00 72 00 73 00 74 00 00 00 NameFirst is equivalent to "First"
0x1E 0A 00 00 00 NameLast is 10 bytes long
0x22 4C 00 61 00 73 00 74 00 00 00 NameLast is equivalent to "Last"
Figure 24: A listing of the elements contained in a stream for the ctitious HelloCom example
the value of this 32-bit integer specifying the size would equal 0x10; seven 2-byte characters
plus a terminating null. The next values would be the characters that represent the name,
followed by a terminating 16-bit value of 0x0000. NameLast would come next, and would
be specied identically to NameFirst, except that the 16-bit variant type specier would
be absent in the stream, since the type is explicitly declared in the property map using
the PROP_ENTRY_TYPE() macro. Table 24 shows an example of the stream described in the
previous paragraphs, with hexadecimal values representing the value in the stream, an oset
showing the position of the value in the stream, and a description of how the values should
be interpreted.
3.3.1.10 COM Persistence in Microsoft Internet Explorer
Microsoft Internet Explorer uses persistence when assigning values to properties of ActiveX
objects. The six main interfaces used by Internet Explorer, ordered by preference, are
IPersistPropertyBag, IPersistMoniker, IPersistFile, IPersistStreamInit,
IPersistStream, and IPersistStorage. The browser will attempt to retrieve an interface
pointer to each persistence interface in sequence until it is successful, or no interfaces have
been found, at which point the operation fails. The rst, and most familiar, persistence
interface is IPersistPropertyBag. IPersistPropertyBag has been specically designed to
allow persistent objects to be embedded within HTML. Take, as an example, the following
HTML code that embeds Microsoft Media Player within a web page.
<OBJECT id="VIDEO" CLASSID=
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"CLSID:6BF52A52 -394A-11d3-B153 -00 C04F79FAA6" >
<PARAM NAME="URL" VALUE=" MyVideo.wmv">
<PARAM NAME=" enabled" VALUE="True">
<PARAM NAME=" AutoStart" VALUE="False">
<PARAM name=" PlayCount" value ="3">
<PARAM name=" Volume" value ="50">
<PARAM NAME=" balance" VALUE ="0">
<PARAM NAME="Rate" VALUE ="1.0" >
<PARAM NAME="Mute" VALUE="False">
<PARAM NAME=" fullScreen" VALUE="False">
<PARAM name=" uiMode" value="full">
</OBJECT >
The <PARAM> tags that appear within the <OBJECT> tag represent the COM object's prop-
erty names and persisted values. When Internet Explorer parses a web page and encounters
these <PARAM> tags, it rst creates a PropertyBag class and queries for the IPropertyBag
interface. Next, it will parse the name and value parameters of the <PARAM> HTML tag
and call the Write() method on the IPropertyBag interface, supplying the name and a
string representation of the value for the property it has parsed. Once Internet Explorer
has loaded all of the <PARAM> tags into a property bag, it will query the COM object (In
the above example, a Media Player object) for an IPersistPropertyBag interface. Internet
Explorer will then call the Load() method of the IPersistPropertyBag interface, passing
the PropertyBag that was parsed from the HTML. The Load() method of the COM ob-
ject will then convert the properties from a string representation into the object's preferred
representation, and subsequently save the converted representation within the COM object.
This strategy is employed by Internet Explorer to resurrect the object from a persistent
state when it encounters the above HTML. The reciprocal operation to the resurrection op-
eration, serialization, is most commonly encountered when using the innerHTML attribute
of an object. Consider the following JavaScript code, used in the same web page as the
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above HTML.
<script language =" JavaScript"> alert(VIDEO.innerHTML ); </script >
Upon processing the previous JavaScript, the web page will alert the user with a message
box with HTML formatted text similar to the following example:
<PARAM NAME="URL" VALUE ="./ MyVideo.wmv">
<PARAM NAME="rate" VALUE ="1">
<PARAM NAME=" balance" VALUE ="0">
<PARAM NAME=" currentPosition" VALUE ="0">
<PARAM NAME=" defaultFrame" VALUE="">
<PARAM NAME=" playCount" VALUE ="3">
<PARAM NAME=" autoStart" VALUE ="0">
<PARAM NAME="_cx" VALUE ="6482" >
<PARAM NAME="_cy" VALUE ="6350" >
When Internet Explorer serializes an object using a PropertyBag, it rst creates an
instance of the PropertyBag class. Next, it queries the object to be persisted for the
IPersistPropertyBag interface. Once the interface is retrieved, Internet Explorer calls
the Save() method, passing the PropertyBag class instance. Finally, Internet Explorer will
serialize the PropertyBag class into a format that is compatible with HTML standards. The
second, less common, way of inserting persistence data into a control over Internet Explorer
is through the use of the data parameter of the <OBJECT> tag. An example of this type of
persistence is shown in the following HTML.
<OBJECT
id="VIDEO"





In the example above, instead of using <PARAM> tags, the persistence data is communi-
cated through the data parameter of the object tag. When Internet Explorer encounters an
object tag in this format, it follows a complex strategy to resurrect the object from the seri-
alized data. Internet Explorer will rst check the le name specied in the data parameter
to see if the le name extension is equal to ".ica", ".stm", or ".ods". If the extension is one
of these, then it creates an IStream that can read binary data from the supplied le URL.
Internet Explorer will then create an instance of the object specied in the rst sixteen
bytes of the le, or, if those sixteen bytes are zero, the CLASSID parameter in the object
tag and query for the IPersistStream interface. If the interface is successfully retrieved,
Internet Explorer will then call the Load() method of the interface, passing in the IStream.
Next, the COM object will parse the stream and convert the binary data into the preferred
representation of each property. Once these operations are nished, Internet Explorer will
have a fully resurrected COM object. If the lename does not match one of the well-known
extensions, Internet Explorer does some extra work to determine what type of persistence
interface to use for the COM object and corresponding persistence data. First, Internet
Explorer will query the COM object for an IPersistFile interface. If the interface is suc-
cessfully retrieved, it will call the Load() method of the COM object's interface, passing in
a le path. It is then the COM object's responsibility to open the le and parse the data.
If the object does not support the IPersistFile interface, Internet Explorer will use the
URL in the data value, and create an IStream object. Next, it will query the COM object
for an IPersistStreamInit interface. If this operation is successful, then Internet Explorer
will call the Load() method of the IPersistStreamInit interface, passing in the IStream
object. If the COM object doesn't support the IPersistStreamInit interface, it will then
attempt to query the object for an IPersistStream interface. If the object implements this
interface, then Internet Explorer will call the Load() method of the IPersistStream in-
terface, passing in the IStream object. If these operations are successful, then the COM
object's IPersistStreamInit or IPersistStream interface is charged with resurrecting the
properties from the given persistence data. If the COM object does not implement either
IPersistStreamInit, or IPersistStream, or the Load() method returns with a failure,
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then Internet Explorer will attempt to load the URL as a compound OLE document by call-
ing StgOpenStorage() from OLE32. If StgOpenStorage() returns with a successful value,
then Internet Explorer will query the COM object for an IPersistStorage interface. If the
COM object indeed implements the IPersistStorage interface, then Internet Explorer will
call the Load() method of the interface, passing in an IStorage object. From here it is,
again, the responsibility of the COM object to parse the data contained in the IStorage
object.
3.3.2 Microsoft ActiveX
ActiveX is a technology derived from Microsoft's COM technology. It is utilized to create
plugins that can be exposed to runtime engines (such as JavaScript and VBScript) to provide
additional capabilities to the host application. Understanding the types of vulnerabilities
that will be explored later in this dissertation requires an in-depth understanding of some of
the COM / Automation architecture. As such, we will present an overview of the relevant
technologies in this section. We will also explore the concept of persistent objects, which are
serialized COM objects that can be optionally embedded within web pages. It will be shown
in section three how persistent COM objects can be used to not only target vulnerabilities
in various COM marshaling components, but also undermine browser security features in
certain scenarios.
3.3.2.1 Plugin Registration
ActiveX controls are a specialization of COM objects, and as such have an entry within
the system registry describing the relevant instantiation information. Like any other COM
object, each ActiveX object is identied by a globally unique Class ID (CLSID), and is
located in the registry at HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\CLSID\{<CLSID>}. Objects can
also be installed on a per-user basis, using the HKEY_CURRENT_USER portion of the
registry. Since COM objects are used so pervasively throughout the Windows OS, Internet
Explorer (IE) needs a way of restricting which COM objects are allowed to be launched
through the web browser. The semantics of the safety mechanisms have gradually become
more granular over time, and will briey be described here.
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Figure 25: ActiveX control marked as Safe for Initialization (SFI) and Safe For Scripting
(SFS)
3.3.2.2 ActiveX Plugins: Safety Controls
IE has several mechanisms for determining whether an ActiveX object has permission to
run. Safety permissions for controls are divided into two categories: initialization and script-
ing. Initialization safety refers to whether or not the control is allowed to be instantiated
based on data from a persistent COM stream (discussed in depth shortly). Scripting safety
refers to whether the control may be manipulated via scripting APIs exposed at runtime.
Registry Controls The rst and most well-known method to mark a control as Safe For
Scripting (SFS) or Safe For Initialization (SFI) is to add specic subkeys below the entry for
the control in the registry. Two values can be added under the Implemented Categories
subkey to mark the control SFS and SFI respectively. These values are 7DD95801-9882-
11CF-9FA9-00AA006C42C4 (CATID_SafeForScripting) and 7DD95802-9882-11CF-9FA9-
00AA006C42C4 (CATID_SafeForInitialization) respectively. Figure 25 shows an example
of a control using these categories.
Controls may programmatically register themselves for these categories using the
StdComponentCategoriesMgr object. The ICatRegister interface contains a
RegisterClassImplCategories() method, which can be used to manipulate the category
registration information for any given COM object. Internally, the
StdComponentCategoriesMgr updates the registry with the above information. Internet
Explorer utilizes the StdComponentCategoriesMgr object as well, but for enumeration rather
than registration. The ICatInformation interface provides a function named
IsClassOfCategories(), which IE can call to determine if a control is SFS or SFI. Again,
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this operation internally queries the above mentioned registry location to determine which
controls the object implements.
3.3.2.3 IObjectSafety Control
An alternative method exists to mark a control as SFS or SFI. An ActiveX control can
provide support for either of these safety restrictions by implementing the IObjectSafety
interface. In this scenario, the security capabilities for the control can be obtained by call-
ing the IObjectSafety::GetInterfaceSafetyOptions() method, which has the following
prototype:
HRESULT IObjectSafety :: GetInterfaceSafetyOptions(
REFIID riid , DWORD *pdwSupportedOptions ,
DWORD *pdwEnabledOptions );
This function will be called by IE to determine the supported set of safety options. If
the interface appears to support the security options, IE will then call the
SetInterfaceSafetyOptions() method of the IObjectSafety interface with the options
that it would like the object to enforce. SetInterfaceSafetyOptions has the following
prototype:
HRESULT IObjectSafety :: SetInterfaceSafetyOptions(
REFIID riid , DWORD dwOptionSetMask ,
DWORD dwEnabledOptions );
If SetInterfaceSafetyOptions() returns successfully, then the application can use the
COM object knowing that the object intends to use the security options requested. The
added value of this API over COM categories is that a control can oer more granular control
over how it is used, since it is able to specify dierent security settings for dierent interfaces,
based on which interface id was specied in the riid parameter for the method calls. Also,
the IObjectSafety interface can execute native code to determine if the application that is
creating the object can do so safely. A specic example of this type of functionality is the
SiteLock template code provided by Microsoft. This template code allows the programmer
to restrict ActiveX controls to a pre-determined list of URLs.
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Figure 26: ActiveX Killbits in IE
3.3.2.4 ActiveX Killbits
IE also implements an override to the standard safety features, allowing administrators to
specically ban the instantiation of selected controls within the browser. This is achieved
by adding a subkey into the HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Internet Ex-
plorer\ActiveX Compatibility registry location. The subkey added must have the CLSID
of the control in question, and contain the DWORD value Compatibility Flags, which has
the killbit set (value 0x400). Figure 26 shows an example of a control with the killbit set.
When an application wishes to determine if the killbit is set, it will call the
CompatFlagsFromClsid() function, which is exported from urlmon.dll.
CompatFlagsFromClsid() has the following prototype:
HRESULT CompatFlagsFromClsid( CLSID *pclsid ,
LPDWORD pdwCompatFlags , LPDWORD pdwMiscStatusFlags );
When the application calls this function, it will pass in the CLSID of the COM object
it is interested in, and two DWORD pointers whose value will be equal to the compatibility
and miscellaneous OLE ags for the object upon the successful return of the function. The
application will then test to see if the 0x400 bit is set to determine if the control has the
killbit set. If the killbit is set, then an entry may appear in the registry for an alternate
class id. This alternate class id will be used in lieu of the original class id within Internet
Explorer. Figure 27 shows a registry entry for a class id that uses an alternate class id. When
dealing with the control in Figure 27, Internet Explorer will transparently translate requests
for COM objects with a class id of {41B23C28-488E-4E5C-ACE2-BB0BBABE99E8} to the
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Figure 27: COM object with an alternate CLSID
Figure 28: Excerpt of the preapproved list
class id of {52A2AAAE-085D-4187-97EA-8C30DB990436}.
3.3.2.5 Preapproved List / ActiveX Opt-In
Microsoft introduced a feature called ActiveX Opt-In with Internet Explorer 7. ActiveX
Opt-In is designed to reduce the attack surface of the browser by prompting the user before
a web page is allowed to instantiate an object that hasn't been loaded before in Internet
Explorer, or wasn't installed by the user through Internet Explorer. Figure 28 shows the
relevant area of the registry: HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\
Windows\CurrentVersion\Ext\PreApproved.
In a base installation of Windows there are a number of controls already on the preap-
proved list. However, there are far more controls that are safe for scripting or initialization
that do not appear on this list. This functionality makes it more desirable to nd aws in
controls on this list, rather than aws in other controls.
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Figure 29: Example of a control restricted from a single user
3.3.2.6 Per-User ActiveX Security
IE8 introduced a series of additional security capabilities related to secure browsing, includ-
ing some renements to ActiveX. Before these capabilities were added, control permissions
that could be congured were congured on a per-machine basis. The new capabilities ex-
tend the per-machine killbit to a per-user level of granularity, and expand upon ActiveX
opt-in by allowing Opt-In functionality based on the user and the domain. Traditionally,
killbits have been used to eectively ban the instantiation of a control system-wide. This
model is problematic in scenarios where a single user on a system of many users required
the use of a particular control, but no others required it. Microsoft expanded upon killbits
by introducing the registry key HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\
Windows\CurrentVersion\Ext\Settings\{CLSID}, where CLSID is the class id of the Ac-
tiveX control to restrict. By setting the Flags value of this key to 1, a control will be
restricted for a single user. Figure 29 shows the Tabular Data Control disabled in this area
of the registry.
Restricting ActiveX controls to certain domains allows the user to have more gran-
ular control over ActiveX security. Originally, SiteLock was the only method that al-
lowed domain restriction, which was not congurable by the end user. This new per-
domain restriction is managed in the registry by adding keys for specic allowed domains
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Figure 30: Example of a control approved to be run from the Microsoft.com domain
to HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\
CurrentVersion\Ext\Stats\{CLSID}\iexplore\AllowedDomains. A key for all domains can
be added here by using the name *, as opposed to a specic domain. Per-Domain opt-in
controls reduce the attack surface by requiring the user to approve the use of an ActiveX
control before it is ran in the context of an unfamiliar domain. In eect, this would require
an attacker to insert malicious web content onto a trusted domain in order to surreptitiously
exploit the ActiveX control. Figure 30 shows the Tabular Data Control congured to run
within the microsoft.com domain without prompting.
3.3.2.7 Internet Explorer Permission GUI
In addition to providing restriction capabilities, Microsoft enhanced the Internet Explorer UI
by adding an interface that allows the user to easily congure ActiveX control permissions
without having to modify the registry. Figure 31 shows how to access the Add-on Manager
interface, and Figure 32 shows how to nd DLLs that are allowed to run in the browser
without permission.
3.3.2.8 ActiveX Safety Wrap-Up
ActiveX has many methods to restrict which controls may load, and how they can be acted
upon under a given context. One reason may very well be that, as interoperability has
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Figure 31: Navigating to the Add-on Manager
Figure 32: Operations to display controls that will run without permission
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increased in applications, so too has opportunities for attackers. Under this premise, ActiveX
security has evolved in an attack-response fashion and has led to a somewhat fractured
security architecture. In later sections, we will show an attack that allows some of these
restrictions to be bypassed, mostly as a result of Microsoft adding security features to the





As discussed in Chapter 1, problems with derived types can occur at all stages of their
lifecycle. This chapter discusses the issues associated with the instantiation of objects.
4.1 C++ Constructor Failure
One of the shortcomings of C++ is there is no way to return an error code from a construc-
tor. In fact, using a return statement anywhere in a constructor will cause at a minimum a
warning during compilation, and in the worse case an error. In any case, the return state-
ment is useless since the only thing that can be returned from a constructor is an instantiated
object. Under certain conditions, constructors have to perform some pretty complex opera-
tions. Consider the code in Figure 33, for example. Here we can see the constructor makes
a call to a web service to retrieve a value for some_property. If that web service request
fails, the value of some_property will be invalid.
There are cases where the developer instantiating the object may not know what a valid
value for the property might be. For example, in the code in Figure 33, if the web service
were to return an integer, and any integer value was valid, there would be no clear way
to determine whether the value was valid. The correct way to handle this situation would
be to catch the exception thrown by curlpp, or to pass the exception to the code that is
instantiating the object. The code in Figure 34 shows how this could be done.
4.1.1 Detecting C++ Constructor Failure With Static Analysis
Detecting constructor failure is an area for future research. This is a very dicult problem
as there are many ways that a constructor can fail. The example in the previous subsection







~Class1 () { };
};
Class1 :: Class1 ()
{
some_property << curlpp :: options ::Url(
std:: string(
"http ://my -rest -interface.com/some_property "));
}






~Class1 () { };
};




some_property << curlpp :: options ::Url(
std:: string(
"http ://my -rest -interface.com/some_property "));
}
catch(curlpp :: RuntimeError & e)
{
std::cout << e.what() << std::endl;
}
}
Figure 34: Example C++ code with a failure in the constructor with proper exception
handling
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4.2 COM Retention Failure
The Microsoft plugin architecture makes extensive use of COM objects and VARIANTs to de-
ne and pass objects between the various components within the browser. Indeed, JavaScript
objects are represented natively in the language runtime as COM objects, whereas VBScript
objects are represented as VARIANTs. A method or property exposed by an ActiveX object
is accessed by calling the IDispatch::Invoke() method of the object, which receives pa-
rameters to the destination function as an array of VARIANTs. (Note that with ActiveX
controls, properties are actually exposed as a pair of method calls that have names of the
form get_XXX() and put_XXX(), where XXX is the name of the property. These two func-
tions retrieve and set the property respectively.) Objects contained within the VARIANTs can
really be any type and value, but most commonly they are either primitive types (such as
integers or strings), or COM interfaces that represent complex objects. Since JavaScript rep-
resents objects internally as IDispatch (or more accurately, IDispatchEx) COM interfaces,
VT_DISPATCH VARIANTs will be the most common COM-based VARIANTs passed to typical
controls, in the context of a browser. COM objects maintain an internal reference count,
and it is manipulated externally by the IUnknown::AddRef() and IUnknown::Release()
methods, which increment and decrement the reference count respectively. Once the refer-
ence count reaches 0, the object will delete itself from memory. Object retention errors in
ActiveX controls are a result of mismanagement of the object's reference count. This section
describes the typical mistakes made by developers when dealing with objects whose lifespan
is greater than the scope of a single function call.
4.2.1 ActiveX Object Retention Attacks I: No Retention
The most obvious mistake a control can make with regard to object retention is to ne-
glect to add to the reference count of a COM object that it intends to retain. When an
ActiveX function takes a COM object as a parameter, the marshaling layer has already
called IUnknown::AddRef() on the received object to ensure that it will not be deleted by
competing threads. However, the marshaller will also release the interface after the plugin
function has returned. Therefore, a plugin object wishing to retain an instance of a COM
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HRESULT CMyObject :: get_MyProperty(IDispatch **out)
{





Figure 35: Code demonstrating the failure to call AddRef()
object beyond the scope of a method must call the IUnknown::AddRef() function before the
method returns. Calling IUnknown::QueryInterface() is also sucient, as this function
will (or at least, should) call IUnknown::AddRef() for the object as well. Failure to call
either of these functions can result in potential stale pointer vulnerabilities. The code in
Figure 35 shows an example of such a problem. The put_MyProperty() function in this code
stores an IDispatch pointer which can later be retrieved by the client application using the
get_MyProperty() function. However, since AddRef() is never used, there is no guarantee
that the pCallback function will still exist when the property is read back by the client.
If every other reference to the object is removed, the object will be de-allocated, leaving
m_pCallback pointing to stale memory.
4.2.2 Detecting COM Retention Failures With Static Analysis
Detecting COM retention failures is an opportunity for future research. There is a direct
correlation to the Automatic Reference Counting technology employed by Apple's Xcode to
prevent retention failures of objective-C objects[16]. While this solution is not perfect, it has
greatly reduced the number of app stability issues introduced by dangling object pointers.
4.3 COM Initialization Failure
Despite being a relatively simple data structure to manipulate, VARIANTs lend themselves
to misuse in certain scenarios due to the deceptive nature of parts of the API. One of the
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key mistakes the authors uncovered when researching VARIANT usage for this work is the
mismatching of VarintInit() and VariantClear() calls. As we mentioned earlier in the
paper, the VariantInit() function is used to initialize a VARIANT structure by setting the
vt member to VT_EMPTY. Conversely, VariantClear() will free the data associated with a
VARIANT, taking into account what type of data is being stored there. It will subsequently set
the type value of the VARIANTs to VT_EMPTY. The important thing to notice here is that any
code path that exists where VariantClear() is called on a VARIANT that has not been ini-
tialized correctly can lead to potential security problems. This is because VariantClear()
will read the uninitialized vt member of the VARIANT and use that to decide how to oper-
ate on the uninitialized VARIANT value. For example, if the vt member was VT_DISPATCH
(0x0009), VariantClear() would take the data member from the VARIANT and dereference
it to make an indirect call, since the process of deleting an IDispatch object involves calling
the IDispatch::Release() function. Omission of the VariantInit() function creates a
condition not unlike the memory management analog of freeing a block of memory without
rst allocating it, with two key dierences: 1. Double VariantClear() is not the same
as double free()  since VariantClear() sets the VARIANT type to VT_EMPTY, any subse-
quent calls to VariantClear() for the same VARIANT will have no eect, and 2. Omission
of VariantInit() is more likely than free() without malloc(), because the code will still
seemingly work correctly most of the time, even if the vulnerable code is exercised. This class
of mistakes is really an uninitialized variable problem, with the additional caveat that the
attacker needs to prime the appropriate memory area with useful data rather than specifying
it directly. That is, the exploitability of these problems is very dependent on the residual
data contained in the memory where the VARIANT was allocated. Under some conditions,
this data is under the control of the attacker, while in other cases, the attacker simply needs
to get lucky. An example VariantInit() omission vulnerability is shown in Figure 36.
As can be seen, a VARIANT located on the stack is manually initialized with the type
VT_DISPATCH, and is presumably lled out with a pointer to an IDispatch interface after
data has been successfully read from the source stream. However, if the IStream::Read()
















Figure 36: Code sample demonstrating the omission of VariantInit()
if it pointed to an IDispatch interface. Although this seems like a relatively unlikely mis-
take to make, there are sometimes variations of the vulnerable code path that are slightly
more subtle. One such example occurs when copying data between VARIANTs using the
VariantCopy() function. The VariantCopy() function clears the destination VARIANT pa-
rameter before copying anything to it. Therefore, the destination parameter passed to
VariantCopy() must be cleared rst as well. The code in Figure 37demonstrates a vulner-
able condition with the same exploitability constraints as the previous example.
Similar problems also exist in other VARIANT API functions, most notably the
VariantChangeType()/VariantChangeTypeEx() functions. These functions will use
VariantClear() in some but not all conversion cases. The rules for when VariantClear()
is called on the destination value are for the most part intuitive; they occur when: An in-
valid conversion attempt is not encountered (i.e., not converting between two incompatible
types), and The VariantClear() will not cause problems when the source and destination
VARIANT are the same, such as converting from a VT_UNKNOWN to a VT_DISPATCH. In terms of
auditing for vulnerabilities, any conversion where the destination parameter is uninitialized
should be viewed critically.
For example, consider the code in Figure 38. Here we see a similar construct to the pre-



























if(var ->vt == VT_BSTR)
return SysAllocString(var ->bstrVal );
else {




res = SysAllocString(dstVar.bstrVal );
VariantClear (& dstVar );
return res;
}
Figure 38: Code sample demonstrating initialization failure with VariantChangeType()
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for exploitation exist: 1. The destination VARIANT is uninitialized, and 2. A conversion from
a regular type to VT_BSTR will result in VariantClear() on the destination VARIANT (such
as VT_I4 to VT_BSTR). As mentioned previously, successful exploitation of the above vulner-
ability would require the attacker to be able to inuence the stack so that the uninitialized
destination VARIANT had useful data in it, such as having a type of VT_DISPATCH and some
sort of valid pointer as the value.
4.3.1 Detecting COM Initialization Failure With Static Analysis
Much like detecting failures in the instantiation of C++ objects is a dicult problem, so too




In the previous chapter, we discussed the sorts of security issues that can arise with complex
object types during the instantiation of those objects. In this chapter, we will discuss the
sorts of security issues that can arise during the lifetime of the object. We will leave the
issues associated with deleting the object to the next chapter.
5.1 C++ Type Confusion
The C++ additions to C create new ways for developers to introduce software vulnerabil-
ities into their code. Some of these extensions introduce safety conditions, including the
type confusion error leading to vtable escape vulnerabilities, that compilers cannot identify
during code generation. In this section, we discuss these issues, the complexities that C++
introduces into reverse engineering process, and the assumptions that underlie our analyses
of Section 5.1.4.
5.1.1 Silent Type Confusion
A number of C++ code-level defects do not present the developer with any sort of compile-
time warning. For example, the static_cast operator (a) converts a pointer to a base class
into a pointer to a derived class, or (b) converts a pointer to or from a void pointer. There
is no check for object congruence; this is not a language error but an deliberate design
choice to allow developers to insert unsafe casts into their software [84]. Casts through
void pointers clearly deactivate all compiler type-checking for the pointer, but common
developer documentation of static_cast omits this behavior, presenting only operation (a)
[87, 55]. Both cast types (a) and (b) violate type safety, and uses of static_cast without
additional safety checks by the developer can result in type confusion. Neither Microsoft
Visual Studio nor g++ warn of unsafe static casts because to do so would violate the very
purpose of the operator. Consider the example code shown in Figure 39a. A human analyst
63
can see that the method debug should never be called on an object of type class1. The
static_cast operation deliberately permits this type of error in software, and both Visual
Studio and g++ build the code without warning or error. Running the compiled code will
crash, perhaps in an exploitable way. At a low-level, when this code executes, it attempts to
dereference the fourth entry in the vtable for class1. Class1, however, only has two entries
in its vtable causing this dereference to read arbitrary memorya vtable escape bug. This
class of vulnerability has impacted widely deployed proprietary software. For example, in
March 2010, Microsoft patched a vulnerability in Excel that was the result of C++ object
type confusion [65]. In April 2011, Adobe announced a 0-day type confusion vulnerability
in their Flash Player [2] after exploits appeared in the wild. Another actively exploited type
confusion vulnerability occurred in the Microsoft ATL [64], a set of C++ template code that
ships with Visual Studio. Developers were inadvertently including the vulnerable code in
their own projects.
5.1.2 Reverse Engineering C++ Software
When C++ code is compiled more high-level information is lost than with what is expe-
rienced in C, leading to many unsolved problems in C++ reverse engineering. Dynamic
dispatch is one of the most signicant challenges: C++ developers can optionally create
objects in such a way that the methods of an object are called through indirection. In
object-oriented design, polymorphism can be achieved by constructing objects that imple-
ment dynamic dispatch. This allows for the substitution of a method's implementation using
the same interface. In C++, this is accomplished by declaring a member function virtual.
All of the virtual functions have a corresponding pointer to the function's implementation
in the vtable of the object. They are each stored in the order that that are declared in the
object and referenced as an oset from the base of the vtable. For example, consider the
code shown in Figure 39a. In this case, there are four virtual member functions in class2.
When this code is compiled, these four functions appear in the vtable as shown in Figure
40b, and as calls are made to those member functions, they will appear as an indirect call


































(a) Excerpt of original source (member function imple-
mentations omitted)
.text:00401000 wmain proc near
.text:00401000
.text:00401000 var_20 = dword ptr -20h
.text:00401000 var_18 = byte ptr -18h
.text:00401000 var_C = dword ptr -0Ch
.text:00401000 var_4 = dword ptr -4
.text:00401000
.text:00401000 push ebp
.text:00401001 mov ebp, esp
.text:00401003 and esp, 0FFFFFFF8h
.text:00401006 push 0FFFFFFFFh
.text:00401008 push offset loc_401A80
.text:0040100D mov eax, large fs:0
.text:00401013 push eax
.text:00401014 sub esp, 14h
.text:00401017 mov eax, __security_cookie
.text:0040101C xor eax, esp
.text:0040101E push eax
.text:0040101F lea eax, [esp+24h+var_C]
.text:00401023 mov large fs:0, eax
.text:00401029 lea ecx, [esp+24h+var_18]
.text:0040102D call class1__class1
.text:00401032 lea ecx, [esp+24h+var_20]
.text:00401036 mov [esp+24h+var_4], 0
.text:0040103E call class2__class2
.text:00401043 lea ecx, [esp+24h+var_18]
.text:00401047 mov byte ptr [esp+24h+var_4], 1
.text:0040104C call class1__addRef
.text:00401051 lea ecx, [esp+24h+var_18]
.text:00401055 call class1__print
.text:0040105A lea ecx, [esp+24h+var_20]
.text:0040105E call class1__addRef
.text:00401063 lea ecx, [esp+24h+var_20]
.text:00401067 call class2__print
.text:0040106C mov eax, [esp+24h+var_20]
.text:00401070 lea ecx, [esp+24h+var_20]
.text:00401074 call dword ptr [eax+0Ch]
.text:00401077 xor eax, eax
.text:00401079 mov ecx, [esp+24h+var_C]
.text:0040107D mov large fs:0, ecx
.text:00401084 pop ecx





Figure 39: C++ code with a type-safety violation
.rdata:00402138 off 402138 dd offset sub 4010D0
.rdata:0040213C dd offset sub 4010A0
.rdata:00402140 dd offset nullsub 1
.rdata:00402144 dd offset sub 4010B0
.rdata:00402148 dd offset dword 402274
.rdata:0040214C off 40214C dd offset sub 4010D0
.rdata:00402150 dd offset sub 4010E0
.rdata:00402154 align 8























cout << “I’m in 














(b) Structure of a C++ object after compilation
Figure 40: Compiled objects in binary code
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5.1.3 Assumptions
Our analyses and implementation provide automated tools that reduce the manual labor a
reverse engineer must employ to better understand commercially available software. This
may be needed to evaluate the security of a given program or to try to inter-operate with
closed source software (e.g., creating a Microsoft Word rendering engine). The techniques
presented in this dissertation are designed to analyze legitimate applications like these ex-
amples, and they may not have applicability to malware or other obfuscated programs.
From a security perspective, legitimate, closed-source applications often require similar lev-
els of analysis as required for malware because attackers will very often leverage software
vulnerabilities in legitimate applications as a way to deliver malware payloads. Hence, un-
derstanding these vulnerabilities is also extremely important. The binaries that we analyze
throughout the paper were all compiled using Microsoft Visual Studio. We chose this as the
target compiler for our analysis because most Windows programs that require reverse engi-
neering are built in this environment. In contrast, applications that are built with the GNU
developer tools are also usually open source and do not require the complex binary analyses
we present here. However, all of the compiler-based issues we discuss are also present in
g++, and our analyses could be extended to other platforms. The basis for the issues we
discuss are rooted in the C++ standard rather than the implementation of that standard
by the various compilers. The analyses presented in this work do not make use of any sort
of Runtime Type Information (RTTI). As RTTI is only optionally compiled into the binary,
we wanted to ensure our analysis would work in its absence.
5.1.4 Detecting C++ Type Confusion With Static Analysis
In this section we introduce a static data ow analysis known as Object Reaching Deni-
tion Analysis. This analysis allows for the identicaiton of vtable escape vulnerabilities by
statically analyzing compiled code. The analysis scans through the compiled binary looking
for uses of C++ objects, and comparing those uses to the type of object that is pointed to
at the use point.
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5.1.4.1 Object Reaching Denition Analysis
As C++ code is compiled, it introduces constructs into the binary that make reverse engi-
neering dicult. Notably, object methods declared as virtual introduce layers of indirection
that can be nearly impossible to manually traverse. To assist in the analysis of C++ com-
piled code, we have created a data-ow analysis called Object Reaching Denition Analysis.
The goal of this analysis is to resolve the indirect virtual function calls present in binary
code. With this resolution in place, analysts can now much more easily navigate the com-
piled code. Additionally, many automated analyses require a complete static call graph. In
resolving the virtual function calls, the static call graph becomes more accurate. Object
Reaching Denition Analysis is detailed in the following subsections.
Object Identication In the data ow analyses that will be introduced in the following
subsections, we will need to be able to identify all of the new objects that are instantiated in
a given basic block. When working directly with source code, identifying the instantiation
of objects is rather easy. They are either declared on the stack as with any other sort of
variable, or they are instantiated on the heap using the new operator. When analyzing
binary code, we do not have access to these obvious identiers and must nd other ways
to locate the instantiation of new objects. Here we present four heuristics to detect the
four ways an object can appear in binary code. Consider the code in Figure 39a. In this
code, the objects C1 and C2 are declared on the stack. Additionally, Visual Studio is set to
aggressively inline functions, so the constructors are inlined as shown in Figure 39b. In this
case, we make the assumption that if we encounter a structure where the rst element is a
pointer to an array of function pointers that we are dealing with an object. In the example
in Figure 39b, the rst element of a structure is being initialized to a pointer to an array
of function pointers at 0x02A. We now assume that this is an object and we will track this
unique type throughout the rest of the program. The next sort of object instantiation we
have to handle is when the object is declared on the heap using the new operator and the
constructor is inlined. In this case, we can be more precise in our determination that we are
dealing with an object and not just a generic structure. We gain this precision because of
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the fact that Visual Studio always applies the mangled name YAPAXI() to the new operator.
g++ similarly always applies the mangled name Znwjxxx() (where xxx may vary) to the
new operator. Now we can apply the same logic as above, but only in cases where the pointer
to an array of function pointers is being assigned to the value returned by one of the known
new operators. The third and fourth types of object instantiation that we must be concerned
with are when the objects are declared on the stack or heap, and the constructors are not
inlined. In this case, we must employ an inter-procedural analysis to determine that we
are dealing with an object. For this analysis, we make another assumption. Compilers will
nearly always make the call to an object's constructor immediately after the call to new.
With that, we assume that the next call we encounter after a call to new is a constructor,
and can validate that assumption with the heuristics mentioned regarding the pointer to a
table of function pointers.
Constructor Analysis In the previous section, we loosely covered the hueristic that we
use to determine that we are dealing with a constructor. To properly track an object's use
throughout the control ow of a program, we need to know more details about that object.
These details can be gleaned from the constructor. Specically, we need to know the size of
the vtable, and which function pointers it stores. Additionally, we need to know the number
and size of the properties stored within the object. To gain a full understanding of the
vtable, we follow the pointer that is assigned to the rst element of the object's structure.
Figure 40a shows the vtable for an object of type class1 as referenced in Figure 39a. We
can see in the code in Figure 39b that the vtable starting at 0x138 is being referenced by
the constructor for class1. In order to perform our later analyses, we need to understand
the precise size of the vtable and the function pointers contained in that table. Here we
will implement some more hueristics. First we need to determine the length of the vtable.
We use a few hints to nd the end of a vtable for a given object. The rst is that if a data
element is pointed to by another program point, it is likely the start of some other data
structure (i.e., the next element past the end of our vtable). The element at 0x14C is an
example of this case. The second hint is that if a pointer in the table does not point to
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a function, we assume that it is the next element past the end of the table. The element
at oset 0x148 is an example of this case. The thrid hint is zero padding. Compilers will
often pad the end of a data structure with zeros. Beginning at oset 0x154, we can see zero
padding past the vtable for class2.
5.1.4.2 Reaching Denition Analysis Algorithm
Now that all of the object instantiations have been identied, we can begin our analysis. The
basis of the analyses we will conduct is what we call Object Reaching Denition Analysis. In
short, we perform a xed-point inter-procedural reaching denition analysis for each object
denition we encountered during the previous step. The data-ow equations used in Object





REACHOUT [S] = GEN [S] ∪ (REACHIN [S]−KILL[S]) (2)
where GEN is the set of objects that were identied as being instantiated using the
hueristics listed in Section 5.1.4.1 and KILL is the set of objects that are deleted. In our
analysis, objects must be tracked interprocedurally. In those cases, REACHIN at the entry
of a function F is equal to REACH[S] at the call site to F from a basic block S.
5.1.4.3 Virtual Function Resolution
Now that we have the sets of objects that reach a given program point, we can use that
information to resolve the virtual function calls that appear in the binary. There are several
cases that can occur when evaluating the reaching denitions. In the rst case, only a single
object denition reaches. In the second case, a single object denition or NULL reaches.
In the third case, a decidable number of object denitions reach. In the nal case, an
undecidable number of object denitions reach. We will discuss each of these cases below:
1. Single Object Denition: In this case, we can make the safe assumption that only a
single object denition reaches a given program point. With this assumption, we can
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.text:00401009 add esp, 4
.text:0040100C test eax, eax
.text:0040100E jz short loc_401019
.text:00401010 call sub_401070
.text:00401015 mov edi, eax
.text:00401017 jmp short loc_40101B
.text:00401019
.text:00401019 loc_401019:





.text:00401022 add esp, 4
.text:00401025 test eax, eax
.text:00401027 jz short loc_401032
.text:00401029 call sub_4010A0
.text:0040102E mov esi, eax
.text:00401030 jmp short loc_401034
.text:00401032
.text:00401032 loc_401032:
.text:00401032 xor esi, esi
.text:00401034
.text:00401034 loc_401034:
.text:00401034 mov eax, [edi]
.text:00401036 mov edx, [eax]
.text:00401038 mov ecx, edi
.text:0040103A call edx
.text:0040103C mov eax, [edi]
.text:0040103E mov edx, [eax+4]
.text:00401041 mov ecx, edi
.text:00401043 call edx
.text:00401045 mov eax, [esi]
.text:00401047 mov edx, [eax]
.text:00401049 mov ecx, esi
.text:0040104B call edx
.text:0040104D mov eax, [esi]
.text:0040104F mov edx, [eax+4]
.text:00401052 mov ecx, esi
.text:00401054 call edx
.text:00401056 mov eax, [esi]
.text:00401058 mov edx, [eax+0Ch]
.text:0040105B mov ecx, esi
.text:0040105D call edx
.text:0040105F pop edi
























int _tmain(int argc, _TCHAR* argv[])
{
class1 *C1 = new class1;






Figure 41: C++ code with heap-declared objects
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resolve the function calls made to methods of the object by simply indexing into the
vtable based on the oset from the base. For example, in the code in Figure 39a, only a
single object denition reaches. In the compiled equivalent in Figure 39b, we can see at
line 0x078 there is a call to edx. Since we have reconstructed the vtable for the object,
we can tell that it is actually a call to debug(). When this situation is encountered, as
we resolve the virtual function calls, we can also check for congruence. The concept
of congruence is explained in detail in Section 5.1.4.4.
2. Single Object Denition with NULL: Visual Studio commonly adds a check for the
return from the new operator and sets it to NULL in the case of failure. In these
instances, it is possible for a developer to end up with a NULL pointer dereference
even though they did not explicitly add this code. The code in Figure 41a at line 0x025
is an example of this check. In these cases, our analysis treats the object denition
exactly as in case 1. Futher work can be done here to determine the safety of this
check insertion.
3. Decidable Number of Object Denitions: In this case, multiple object denitions reach
a given program point, but we are able to determine the exact number and type
of those objects. When this situation is encountered, we rst check for congruence
between all of the objects that reach. If they are not all congruent, there is likely a
type safety condition. We trigger a warning to this condition. If they are congruent,
we continue the analysis to determine the safety of the use of the object as done in
case 1.
4. Undecidable Number of Object Denitions: This case occurs when objects are instanti-
ated and stored in a manner that does not allow our hueristics to determine their type.
This scenario is typically encountered when a class pointer is stored in a collection of
some type. In other words, when a class pointer is stored and retrieved from the heap
in a manner other than direct variable assignment, our reaching denition analysis will
fail. An example of this would be instantiating an object and storing its pointer in a
std::map. Since this object can now be referenced by the key value, we cannot check
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for congruence or resolve the virtual function calls.
5.1.4.4 Object Congruence
In addition to using object reaching denition analysis for virtual function resolution, we can
also test for object congruence. We dene two objects as being congruent when they are
made up of the same number of methods and properties. Additionally, the method at each
equivalent location in the two vtables must require the same number and type of arguments.
The properties of the two objects must also correspond in size and type at each oset in
the property table. As binary code is analyzed in the manner described in Section 5.1.4.3,
when an object use is identied, we implement a congruence check to make sure the object
is being referenced in a way that is safe with regard to the actual object type that reaches
that use. This becomes particularly important when more than one object denition reaches
a given use. We have to ensure that all of the object types are congruent, and that any
object, when referenced, will be done so safely. If even one of the possible reaching object
denitions is unsafe for use, the program point as a whole has to be marked unsafe. This
is because static analysis cannot guarantee which object denition will be actually used at
runtime.
5.1.4.5 Implementation
In order to test and verify the data ow algorithms presented in Section 5.1.4.2, we created
a framework called llvm-decomp . This tool allows us to reverse x86 compiled binaries into
the intermediate representation used by the LLVM compiler framework. Then, we are able
to use the analysis capabilities in LLVM to implement the algorithms for Object Reaching
Denition Analysis, virtual function resolution, and object congruence testing. This section
presents the details on how this system was built.
5.1.4.6 High-Level Architecture
As compiled binaries are translated into the LLVM IR and analyzed, the data traverses
several tools and formats. In this section we describe the high-level architecture of the











Figure 42: High-Level Architecture of llvm-decomp: Representation of how data ows from
x86 assembly through to the LLVM IR for analysis
The initial input into llvm-decomp is C++ compiled x86 machine code. We chose to perform
our analyses on compiled code to assist reverse engineers in understanding the complexities
that are introduced by C++. There are several commercially available and free tools for
disassembling machine code into its assembly equivalent. In llvm-decomp, we use IDA
Pro for this step. IDA Pro is a commercially available disassembler with an extensive
set of tools available for use by reverse engineers. It focuses almost entirely on analyzing
the assembly representation of the compiled code. IDA Pro oers a plugin infrastructure
whereby a developer can interoperate with the analysis framework. In llvm-decomp, we
created a plugin for IDA Pro called llvm-bcwriter. llvm-bcwriter traverses the assembly
code and translates it into the LLVM intermediate representation. The converted IR is
then written to LLVM's bitcode format to be consumed by their analysis framework in the
next step. This conversion process is described in detail below. With a completed bitcode
le, we can now implement the analyses detailed in Section 5.1.4.1 using the tool suite
provided with LLVM. Specically, we use a tool called opt that allows developers to test
custom code analyses. It provides the same infrastructure that would be available inside the
compiler without requiring compiled output. opt disassembles the bitcode into the LLVM
IR and provides interfaces for analysis. There are several benets to operating with the
LLVM IR because it is a static single assignment form. One of which is the use-def chains
are implicit which greatly assists in the reaching denition analysis as described in Section
5.1.4.7. Much like IDA Pro, opt provides a plugin infrastructure for custom analysis. In
this phase of our framework, we created a plugin for opt called ClassTracker. ClassTracker
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performs a reaching denition analysis on objects as they appear in the LLVM IR.With this
reaching denition analysis completed, we can resolve virtual function calls, and perform
type-safety checks on object usage. These processes are covered in detail in Section 5.1.4.9.
With the virtual function resolution performed by ClassTracker, we can now propogate that
information back into the LLVM IR or even the disassembly. With this information provided
in these lower-level formats, other analyses are now possible that were previously broken by
dynamic dispatch.
Phases of Decompilation The decompilation performed by llvm-decomp is completed
in multiple passes over the disassembly provided by IDA Pro. This is largely due to some
nuances in the LLVM framework as well as in IDA Pro. The phases required are:
1. Create a generic class object: We have to rst create a generic class object that can be
used as a type specier for any object we encounter in later phases of decompilation.
This class is generated by creating an LLVM global variable consisting of a structure
with two pointers. The rst points to an arbitrarily large array of function pointers.
This will hold the vtable for real objects that are discovered during decompilation.
The second points to an arbitrarily large array of unsigned integers. This is used to
hold the object properties. Types can be manipulated at a later time.
2. Collect all the functions in the module: In order to properly populate an LLVM
module, we have to rst collect all of the functions that are contained in the compiled
binary. This information is provided to us by IDA Pro using the getnfunc() API.
This allows us to loop through all of the known functions in IDA Pro, and create the
equivalent in the LLVM module. During this process, we must also properly dene
the number and type of arguments and local variables used in each function. While
this information is conveyed graphically in IDA Pro, it is not readily available through
the API. As such, we developed a number of heuristics to uncover this information. In
the case of C++ compiled binaries, Visual Studio will make frequent use of thiscall
and fastcall calling conventions. This adds to the number of heuristics required to
properly dene the functions in the LLVM module.
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3. Insert basic blocks into each function: Once the functions are dened in the LLVM
module, we can add the basic blocks to the function. Basic block information is not
provided through the base API in IDA Pro. As such, we implemented our own basic
block discovery algorithm based on the one by Moretti, et al [68].
4. Add instructions to basic blocks: Now that the basic blocks for each function are
dened, we can add the instructions. At this point we need to reduce the assembly
equivalent to the LLVM intermediate representation. This phase is where the majority
of the work is required to complete the binary translation. The following steps are
followed:
(a) Survey all available LLVM IR operations: First we need to know all of the oper-
ations that we may need to represent in the IR. The LLVM IR instruction set is
rather small and well documented.
(b) Enumerate collections of assembly instructions: We then enumerate all of the
collections of assembly instructions that map to the appropriate LLVM instruc-
tion. This again is represented as a nite set of collections of instructions that
have the same functional meaning as one of the higher-level LLVM operations.
(c) Track processor state for a given basic block: During the binary translation
process, the processor state can dier wildly depending on which branch of the
control ow is taken. As such, a processor state object is maintained for each
basic block. In this object, we store the state of the registers and the stack, so
as data is referenced, we have an accurate representation of what data is held at
that program point.
(d) Insert phi nodes into the IR: We have to be able to account for conditions where
a register or memory location can dier in value depending on the control ow
leading to a given program point. To account for this condition, the LLVM IR
implements phi nodes. Phi nodes are operators that allow for a single variable to
represent two or more values. As phi nodes are encountered, the analysis proceeds
as if that variable is equal to more than one value at the same time.
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(e) Complete instruction mapping: Now that we can track processor state, and han-
dle multiple control ows, we can complete the mapping from x86 assembly to
LLVM IR. This is handled with a rather straightforward state machine in which
we track the known groups of instructions that match to the known LLVM oper-
ators. These groups of instructions can of course be interleaved in the assembly,
so often several instruction groups are tracked at once.
(f) Handle unknown instructions: It is unrealistic to plan for all possible collections
of instructions ahead of time. As such, there are times when the instruction col-
lection states get lost. In these cases, LLVM allows for the insertion of platform-
specic inline assembly. When llvm-bcwriter cannot nd a mapping between a
collection of assembly instructions and an LLVM operation, it will emit the x86
assembly inline into the IR. The processor state object is updated to reect the
changes made in the assembly and the binary translation continues. Under some
circumstances, the binary translation is able to continue without any other errors.
In other cases, the remaining binary code was too dependent on the instructions
that were not understood and the rest of the translation fails.
5. Emit LLVM binary representation: Once the process listed above is complete, we
have an LLVMmodule which represents the binary equivalent. At this point, the
code can be written to the LLVM binary form which they call bitcode (note - not
bytecode). The LLVM module that has been created is written to bitcode using
the WriteBitcodeToFile() LLVM API. This will generate the LLVM version of a
compiled binary and write it to disk. This binary, however, is a binary representation
of the LLVM SSA-based intermediate representation; not a native executable. With a
completed LLVM intermediate representation of the code, we can now move on to use
the LLVM analysis tools to implement the analyses listed in Section 5.1.4.2. However,
it is worth noting that there is a benet for a reverse engineer at this point in the
framework. The SSA-based intermediate reprsentation used by LLVM is very easy
to read, and in many cases will represent vulnerable code more clearly than the x86
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assembly equivalent. As such, in the llvm-decomp framework, we run llvm-dis to
generate the textual equivalent of the intermediate representation and write the results
to disk. We are then able to load this le in a new view in IDA Pro to provide two
dierent representations of the same binary to assist in analysis.
5.1.4.7 Analyzing the Intermediate Representation
The next phase of llvm-decomp is provide the bitcode le that was generated by llvm-
bcwriter as input into the tool opt. opt allows us to create custom analyses while taking
advantage of all of the infrastructure available in the LLVM compiler.
5.1.4.8 Interoperating with LLVM
opt allows for the creating and testing of custom compiler analyses without the need for
generating compiled output (although it can do that too). This is done by loading a custom
library by passing the -load option to opt. This library then registers to be called at various
points in the analysis. It can be called at the module, function, basic block, or instruction
levels. At each of these points, the function being called can assert its placement in the
dependency tree. In other words, the custom analysis can be called before or after any of
the pre-existing analyses. At each of those analysis levels, a nal hook point is available
called doFinalization. This allows for a set of clean up routines to be run after all of the
analysis is complete.
5.1.4.9 ClassTracker
In the llvm-decomp framework, we created a plugin for opt called ClassTracker. ClassTracker
performs all of the analysis that is described in Section 5.1.4.2. To accomplish each of these
analyses, it performs the following tasks:
1. Collect all constructors: ClassTracker rst registers for a function-level analysis to
collect all of the constructors it can nd in the IR. This is mostly important for the
cases where the constructor is not inlined. In cases where the constructor is inlined
it would be simple to combine this step with the next step. When the constructor is
explicitly called, this analysis works better with a known set of constructors ahead of
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time. Each constructor is stored as an opaque value that we can later reference as the
object's type. Without any other sort of type identication in the binary, this opaque
value will suce. An object is created of the stored type using the constructor analysis
techniques detailed in Section 5.1.4.1.
2. Identify all new objects: In the next pass over the code, ClassTracker again registers
for a functionlevel analysis and enumerates all of the instantiations of new objects.
This is done using the hueristics presented in Section 5.1.4.1. Information about the
object is stored for later use. This includes the instruction that instantiated the object,
and the opaque value that represents its type.
3. Identify object use: ClassTracker then registers for a doFinalization analysis at the
module level. In this analysis, the code is scanned looking for all object uses. This is
done by looking for dereferences from a base pointer. This rather loose heuristic works
just ne for the reasons explained in the next point.
4. Perform reaching denition analysis: This analysis step is to perform a reaching def-
inition analysis on the object denitions that reach the program points identied in
the previous step. In LLVM, this is extremely simple. Because the LLVM IR is an
SSA-based IR implementing phi nodes, the reaching denition analysis is basically
complete. In an SSA format, the use-point of a given object must chain directly back
to the denition-point of that object. Consider Appendix A, for example. Here we can
see the instruction call %35. Because of the SSA format, we can follow this denition
back to %34, %33, and so on until we hit the phi node at %11, and can determine
the class type. Additionally, if more than one denition reaches at the entry point
to a given basic block, this information would be captured in a phi node. Therefore
the phi node is actually REACHIN[S] from data ow equation (1) in Section 5.1.4.2
So following each path back from this point will uncover the various denitions that
reach. In cases where step 3 incorrectly identied an object use, there will be no object
denitions that reach, and this instruction is discarded.
5. Perform virtual function resolution: Now that we have collected all of the object use
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points and their potential denitions, we can x up the virtual function calls. This is
done by iterating over each of the instructions found in step 4. For each call instruction,
the oset from the base of the object is determined and used to index into the vtable of
the object stored in step 2. This lookup provides the function name (or address) that
is actually being referenced for that object type. If more than one object denition
reaches, this lookup occurs for each object type.
6. Perform congruence check: As the function lookups are occuring the previous step, we
simultaneously check to make sure that there actually is a function at the dereferenced
oset for the any and all object denitions that reach that instruction. In cases where
the code attempts to dereference a function pointer beyond the end of the vtable, the
analysis reports an error.
7. Propagate information back: Now that the virtual function calls have been resolved,
we can propagate that information back into IDA Pro and the LLVM IR. In both
cases, the function name (or address) is retreived using the procedure in step 5, and
inserted into the text of the assembly or IR as a comment next to its use. In the case
of IDA Pro, it recognizes this comment as being a function name (or address) and
allows the user to navigate to that function by highlighting the comment and pressing
enter.
5.1.4.10 Results
By employing the data ow analysis techniques documented in this dissertation, we demon-
strate that we can increase the eectiveness of existing static analysis techniques on compiled
C++ code, as well as identify a class of vulnerability that is often overlooked by existing
techniques. Most importantly, all of this analysis can be performed on a compiled binary
with no access to the original source. This allows for third parties like software develop-
ers, security analysts, or a software consumer software looking to validate code quality to
gain a much better view into the code constructs embedded in a compiled binary. To test






virtual void addRef ();
virtual void print ();
virtual void voidFunc1 () { };






virtual void addRef ();
virtual void print ();
};
int _tmain(int argc , _TCHAR* argv []) {
class1 *C1 = new class1;
class2 *C2 = new class2;








Figure 43: Original Source
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.text :00401000 _wmain proc near
.text :00401000 push esi
.text :00401001 push edi
.text :00401002 push 8
.text :00401004 call ??2 @YAPAXI@Z
.text :00401009 add esp , 4
.text :0040100C test eax , eax
.text :0040100E jz short loc_401019
.text :00401010 call sub_401070
.text :00401015 mov edi , eax
.text :00401017 jmp short loc_40101B
.text :00401019
.text :00401019 loc_401019:
.text :00401019 xor edi , edi
.text :0040101B
.text :0040101B loc_40101B:
.text :0040101B push 8
.text :0040101D call ??2 @YAPAXI@Z
.text :00401022 add esp , 4
.text :00401025 test eax , eax
.text :00401027 jz short loc_401032
.text :00401029 call sub_4010A0
.text :0040102E mov esi , eax
.text :00401030 jmp short loc_401034
.text :00401032
.text :00401032 loc_401032:
.text :00401032 xor esi , esi
.text :00401034
.text :00401034 loc_401034:
.text :00401034 mov eax , [edi]
.text :00401036 mov edx , [eax]
.text :00401038 mov ecx , edi
.text :0040103A call edx
.text :0040103C mov eax , [edi]
.text :0040103E mov edx , [eax+4]
.text :00401041 mov ecx , edi
.text :00401043 call edx
.text :00401045 mov eax , [esi]
.text :00401047 mov edx , [eax]
.text :00401049 mov ecx , esi
.text :0040104B call edx
.text :0040104D mov eax , [esi]
.text :0040104F mov edx , [eax+4]
.text :00401052 mov ecx , esi
.text :00401054 call edx
.text :00401056 mov eax , [esi]
.text :00401058 mov edx , [eax+0Ch]
.text :0040105B mov ecx , esi
.text :0040105D call edx
.text :0040105F pop edi
.text :00401060 xor eax , eax
Figure 44: Corresponding Binary
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"401034": ; preds = %"401032" , %"401029"
. . .





















Figure 45: Excerpt from LLVM bitcode le generated by llvm-bcwriter
combinations of stack or heap object declaration and inline or explicit constructor. These
programs were compiled without symbols and were provided to IDA Pro as input. In each
case, the system was tested for its ability to resolve virtual function calls and to identify
instances of type confusion. An example of this process is detailed in Section 5.1.4.10. We
created a more complex test where an object is declared in one function and referenced in
another function, testing the ability of llvm-decomp to perform the analyses described in
Section 6.1.3.1 on an interprocedural basis. This test is detailed in Section 5.1.4.10.
Heap-Declared Object, Explicit Constructor Figure 43 shows an unsafe use of static
cast through a void pointer resulting in a vtable escape error. The source code shows two
heap-declared objects C1 and C2. In the disassembly of the code shown in Figure 44, we
see that the constructors for the two objects are explicitly called at lines 0x010 and 0x029
respectively. Additionally, we can see several calls to virtual functions. Lines 0x03A and
0x043 correspond to the calls to addRef() and print() for C1. Lines 0x04B and 0x054
correspond to the calls to addRef() and print() for C2. We can see the erroneous call to
debug at line 0x05D. After translating the code in Figure 44 to the LLVM IR, it appears as
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shown in Figure 45. This is an excerpt of the full code that is emitted from llvm-bcwriter.
In the LLVM IR, we can see the virtual function calls just as in the disassembly, but it is
still just as unclear which function will actually get called. In the LLVM IR, we see the
instructions call void %29 and call void %35, which correspond to the calls to addRef()
and print() for C1. We also see the instructions call void %41 and call void %47,
corresponding to the same functions in C2. The nal call, call void %53, corresponds to
the erroneous call to debug. When the Object Reaching Denition analysis in ClassTracker
is applied to this code, the various function calls were resolved except for the call to debug.
In this case there was no corresponding method in the vtable, and ClassTracker returns a
vtable escape error. The detailed output from ClassTracker can be seen in Appendix B.
Interprocedural Analysis The previous example shows how llvm-decomp is able to
translate binary code into the LLVM IR and perform Object Reaching Denition Analysis.
However, the vulnerable code that it was able to identify is very unlikely to ever appear in
production code. We would hope that this sort of type-casting would be identied through
simple code review. Consider the more complex example in Figure 46: an object is declared
in one function and referenced by another function. This code is much more realistic,
especially when we consider the possibility that the function internalFunction() could be
called from many dierent places in the code, each passing in dierent object types. In this
example, the source code shown in Figure 46 is compiled to the binary representation shown
in Figure 47.
Sub 401000 corresponds to the function internalFunction(). We can see in this sub-
routine that it makes three virtual function calls, corresponding to addRef(), print(), and
debug(). This binary is provided as input into llvm-bcwriter, which produces the LLVM
IR shown excerpted in Figure 45a. Here we can see the calls to the virtual functions ap-
pearing as call void %6, call void %13, and call void %20 respectively. When running
ClassTracker on the IR shown in Figure 46, the analysis made two passes over the function
internalFunction because it is called twice in this code. In the rst pass, the virtual function






virtual void addRef ();
virtual void print ();
virtual void voidFunc1 () { };






virtual void addRef ();
virtual void print ();
};
int internalFunction(void *pv) {
static_cast <class1*>(pv)->addRef ();
static_cast <class1*>(pv)->print ();
static_cast <class1*>(pv)->debug (); return 0;
}
int _tmain(int argc , _TCHAR* argv []) {
class1 *C1 = new class1;





Figure 46: Original source for denition of class1
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.text :00401000 sub_401000 proc near
.text :00401000
.text :00401000 mov eax , [esi]
.text :00401002 mov edx , [eax]
.text :00401004 mov ecx , esi
.text :00401006 call edx
.text :00401008 mov eax , [esi]
.text :0040100A mov edx , [eax+4]
.text :0040100D mov ecx , esi
.text :0040100F call edx
.text :00401011 mov eax , [esi]
.text :00401013 mov edx , [eax+0Ch]
.text :00401016 mov ecx , esi
.text :00401018 call edx
.text :0040101A xor eax , eax
.text :0040101C retn
.text :0040101C sub_401000 endp
.text :0040101C
.text :00401020 _wmain proc near
.text :00401020 push esi
.text :00401021 push edi
.text :00401022 push 8
.text :00401024 call ??2 @YAPAXI@Z
.text :00401029 add esp , 4
.text :0040102C test eax , eax
.text :0040102E jz short loc_401039
.text :00401030 call sub_401080
.text :00401035 mov esi , eax
.text :00401037 jmp short loc_40103B
.text :00401039
.text :00401039 loc_401039:
.text :00401039 xor esi , esi
.text :0040103B
.text :0040103B loc_40103B:
.text :0040103B push 8
.text :0040103D call ??2 @YAPAXI@Z
.text :00401042 add esp , 4
.text :00401045 test eax , eax
.text :00401047 jz short loc_401061
.text :00401049 call sub_4010C0
.text :0040104E mov edi , eax
.text :00401050 call sub_401000
.text :00401055 mov esi , edi
.text :00401057 call sub_401000
.text :0040105C pop edi
.text :0040105D xor eax , eax




.text :00401061 xor edi , edi
Figure 47: Compiled binary for class1
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pointer assigned to each call site. These are the methods belonging to class C2. Here again
ClassTracker reported for the erroneous call to debug.
5.2 COM Type Confusion
As we previously saw in the technology overview of this dissertation, the VARIANT data
structure is used extensively throughout Microsoft code as a standardized, language agnostic
method of representing a variety of data types. The API for manipulating VARIANT data
structures has been introduced in the overview section of this dissertation. We will now
explore how mismanagement of VARIANT structures either directly or through the well-dened
API can lead to a number of subtle type confusion scenarios.
5.2.1 VARIANT Type Confusion Attacks I: Permissive Property Maps
As was discussed earlier, Microsoft's ATL helps developers rapidly develop COM compo-
nents by distributing template code for a collection of interfaces. Microsoft has written
the template code in an abstract manner, which allows the template code to be used in a
large variety of situations; however, there are also subtle consequences of utilizing some of
the available code. Specically, the manner in which the developer used to specify COM
object properties using property maps has some subtle nuances that could potentially lead
to opportunities for an attacker to perform type confusion attacks. Consider the follow-
ing macros available in version 9 of the Microsoft ATL, which can be used for specifying
individual properties within a property map.
It is important to note that neither PROP_ENTRY nor PROP_ENTRY_EX require a parameter
to specify the VARIANT type. Recall from our previous discussion about persistence that
when these functions are used, the persistence stream will contain two bytes that identify
the serialized type preceding the serialized data. Once the member being described has been
de-serialized, the ATL code will call the put property method of the IDispatch interface
that the property map species in order to write the data to the COM object. In summary,
utilizing these macros provides a possible opportunity to provide any type of VARIANT to
the put method of the IDispatch interface without forcing coercion to a specic data type.











#define PROP_DATA_ENTRY(szDesc , member , vt) \
{OLESTR(szDesc), 0, &CLSID_NULL , NULL , \
offsetof(_PropMapClass , member), \
sizeof ((( _PropMapClass *)0)-> member), vt},
#define PROP_ENTRY(szDesc , dispid , clsid) \
{OLESTR(szDesc), dispid , &clsid , &__uuidof(IDispatch), \
0, 0, VT_EMPTY},
#define PROP_ENTRY_EX(szDesc , dispid , clsid , iidDispatch) \
{OLESTR(szDesc), dispid , &clsid , &iidDispatch , 0, 0, VT_EMPTY},
#define PROP_ENTRY_TYPE(szDesc , dispid , clsid , vt) \
{OLESTR(szDesc), dispid , &clsid , &__uuidof(IDispatch), 0, 0, vt},
#define PROP_ENTRY_TYPE_EX(szDesc , dispid , clsid , iidDispatch , vt) \
{OLESTR(szDesc), dispid , &clsid , &iidDispatch , 0, 0, vt}
Figure 48: Example COM property map
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Figure 49: Dierence between PROP_ENTRY_* macros and PROP_DATA_ENTRY
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an arbitrary VARIANT type, then using this type of property declaration can lead to possible
type confusion problems. This type of vulnerability is more likely to be found in objects
that aren't used in Internet Explorer, or in interfaces that implement IDispatch that are
specied in the property map, but are not accessible from Internet Explorer. Developers
may also elect to use PROP_DATA_ENTRY() instead of PROP_ENTRY(). The PROP_DATA_ENTRY
macro is unique, in that the data for that property is not ltered by an IDispatch interface.
Instead, it is written directly to an oset within the class memory that holds the property
data. If the variant type supplied to the macro is VT_EMPTY, then the persistence code will
read up to the number of bytes available for the property within the class. The process for
unpacking PROP_DATA_ENTRY properties versus PROP_ENTRY macros is illustrated in Figure
49. So, the use of the PROP_DATA_ENTRY() macro provides attackers with two interesting
opportunities:
1. The ability to create a property directly in the destination object's memory possibly
without having any typing requirements, and
2. The ability to provide properties that have undergone absolutely no validation If the
PROP_DATA_ENTRY macro is specied in a type-less manager then these properties are
quite dangerous.
If they are constructed with the type specied as VT_EMPTY, then code that subsequently
utilizes such properties will almost certainly contain type confusion vulnerabilities, since
it has no way to validate what type of data it is operating on. For example, consider a
case where a PROP_DATA_ENTRY property is intended to be a pointer to a string or some
other more complex object. By specifying an integer type instead of the intended object,
a type confusion vulnerability will be triggered, with the end result more than likely being
arbitrary execution. Conversely, there may be a situation where a property member is
expected to be an integer, but the attacker species a pointer instead (by specifying a string
or something else). This example type confusion vulnerability will more than likely result in
an information leak, and ultimately disclose the value of a pointer. These types of problems





WXDLLEXPORT bool wxConvertOleToVariant(const VARIANTARG& oleVariant ,
wxVariant& variant) {
switch (oleVariant.vt & VT_TYPEMASK) {
case VT_BSTR: {
wxString str(wxConvertStringFromOle(oleVariant.bstrVal ));
variant = str; break;
}
...
Figure 50: Code sample showing a subtle VARIANT type confusion vulnerability
found in contemporary Windows operating systems. Furthermore, it is worth considering
that PROP_DATA_ENTRY properties are set directly, and hence bypass any level of validation
that the put property of the IDispatch interface may enforce. This means there may be
cases where setting these properties directly may circumvent the sanitization process to
some degree, since it might be carried out in the put property method. Therefore, there are
potential opportunities for an attacker to exploit the object in question when the property
is utilized under the tenuous assumption that it is sanitized in a certain manner. VARIANT
5.2.2 Type Confusion Attacks II: Misinterpreting Types
One area that is prone to potential problems when dealing with VARIANT data structures
is correctly interpreting the vt member. In contrast to the NPAPI variant data structures,
recall that the type parameter in a VARIANT can be a basic type, or a complex type composed
of bits that represent a basic type and a modier (or two modiers, if one of them is
VT_BYREF). The misinterpretation of the vt member can occur when bit masking is performed
incorrectly, leading to subtle vulnerabilities where the VARIANTs value is utilized as one type
when it is in fact, another. To illustrate this point, consider the following code:
The astute reader will notice that this code has a very obvious aw: a type check is
performed using a mask to obtain the basic type of the VARIANT. In the case of a BSTR, the
string is passed to a function which basically duplicates it. The problem here is that if a




// Test if object is an array of integers
VARTYPE baseType = pVarSrc ->vt & VT_TYPEMASK;
if( (baseType != VT_I4 && baseType != VT_UI4) ||
((pVarSrc ->vt & VT_ARRAY) == 0) )
return -1;
psa = pVarSrc ->parray;
// operate on SAFEARRAY
SafeArrayAccessData(psa , &pValues );
...
Figure 51: An attempt at xing the vulnerable code
of this function were to supply a VARIANT with the type (VT_BYREF|VT_BSTR) for example,
it would cause a pointer to a BSTR to be placed within the VARIANT rather than a BSTR.
(A BSTR is really a WCHAR * with a 32-bit length preceding it, so a BSTR * is a WCHAR **.)
Therefore, utilization of any modiers on VARIANTs passed to this function will result in a
type confusion vulnerability. Consider this slightly more subtle example:
This code performs some checking to ensure that an input type is an array of either
signed, or unsigned integers. If it is not, then an error is signaled by returning the value -1.
However, there is also a problem in this code  the check for the variant type fails to take
into account that the type can have the VT_BYREF bits set. Since the VT_ARRAY modier is
not mutually exclusive with VT_BYREF, the above code has a type confusion vulnerability
when dealing with a VARIANT with the type (VT_BYREF|VT_ARRAY|VT_I4). In this case, a
SAFEARRAY ** will be incorrectly interpreted as a SAFEARRAY *, leading to out of bounds
memory accesses. The following code is a real-world example taken from IE (all present
versions). This example is part of the core marshalling code for the DOM. The code in
question is charged with verifying VARIANT parameters received from scripting hosts plugged
into the DOM are correct and, if necessary, converting those parameters into the expected
types. Although each DOM function takes dierent types of parameters, most marshalling
routines, at their core, use the same function, VARIANTArgToCVar(), which takes a single
VARIANT and attempts to convert it to the expected type. The vulnerable code is shown
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int VARIANTARGToCVar(VARIANT *pSrcVar , int *res ,





if(!(vt & VT_BYREF )) {
// Type mismatch - attempt conversion
if( (pSrcVar ->vt & (VT_BYREF|VT_TYPEMASK ))
!= vt && vt != VT_VARIANT) {
hr = VariantChangeTypeSpecial (&var ,
pSrcVar , vt, pProvider , 0);
if(FAILED(hr))
return hr;





*( PSHORT)outVar = pSrcVar ->iVal;
break;
case VT_I4:
*(PLONG)outVar = pSrcVar ->lVal;
break;
case VT_DISPATCH:
*( PDISPATCH)outVar = pSrcVar ->pdispVal;
break;




Figure 52: Attempted x that ignores the complete length of the type mask
below.
The code in question attempts to retrieve the value of an input parameter, pSrcVar,
performing a type conversion if the received VARIANT isn't of the expected type given in the
vt parameter. The problem in this code occurs when comparing the received input VARIANTs
type with the expected type. Specically, a test is done by comparing the expected type
with the input type after the input type has been masked with (VT_BYREF|VT_TYPEMASK),
or 0x4FFF. Performing this mask loses signicant information, which in this case is the
VT_ARRAY (0x2000) and VT_VECTOR (0x1000) modiers. To illustrate the problem, consider
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the case where this function is expecting a VT_DISPATCH input type (0x0009) and the input
VARIANT is an array of VT_DISPATCH types (VT_ARRAY|VT_DISPATCH, or 0x2009). Since
(0x2009 & 0x4FFF) produces the result 0x0009, or VT_DISPATCH, this code will incorrectly
assume it received an IDispatch object rather than an array of IDispatch objects. The
result is this function signals success and returns a pointer to a SAFEARRAY which it has
incorrectly evaluated as a pointer to an IDispatch interface. Thus, this code culminates to
a type confusion vulnerability. An assessor auditing for vulnerabilities in the use of VARIANT
type masks must pay close attention to how the vt member of the VARIANT is manipulated.
Specically, the masking of input VARIANT types needs to be performed with caution to
ensure that information is not overlooked when performing any validation steps. VARIANT
5.2.3 Type Confusion Attacks III: Direct Type Manipulation
Another construct that can result in type confusion vulnerabilities is directly manipulating
the vt member of a VARIANT, rather than using the API functions. Although this should
be a fairly straightforward task in theory, subtle vulnerabilities can be introduced by either
not correctly enforcing data types, or not correctly ensuring that a type conversion was
successful. For example, the following code has been taken from Microsoft's internal version
of the ATL. This code is invoked when performing de-serialization of a COM object from
a persistence stream. Note that in this particular example, the VARIANT data structure is
wrapped in a C++ object, CComVariant. The class member vt in this code corresponds to
the vt type variable in a VARIANT structure. The example listed above is contrived; however,
the we have identied a real-world scenario where this type of bug has occurred. Microsoft's
internal version of the ATL has special code to process variants in a persistence stream that
is similar to the following example.
The issue with the above code is that the return value of the ChangeType() function is
not checked before manually setting the variant type. This mistake allows an attacker to
make the program believe a BSTR value the attacker supplied is any type not handled in the
xed width data types handler. In one scenario, an attacker can specify that a string that
he has supplied should be treated as an array of VT_DISPATCH objects. When this function
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hr = pStream ->Read(&vtRead , sizeof(VARTYPE), NULL);





// Attempts to read fixed width data types here
CComBSTR bstrRead;




bstrVal = bstrRead.Detach ();
if (vtRead != VT_BSTR) {





Figure 53: Code excerpt from Microsoft ATL
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returns an error, the caller will attempt to free the string using the VariantClear() function.
This ends up causing the program to treat the attacker supplied string as an array of vtables,
a clear type confusion error, ultimately allowing for arbitrary code execution.
5.2.4 Detecting Type Confusion Attacks With Static Analysis
Detecting type confusion attacks against COM objects is an opportunity for future research.
A similar analysis could be developed to the one described in Section 5.1.4. While the
memory layout for a COM object is not identical to that of a C++ object, it is similar. The
concepts from Section 5.1.4 could be adapted to t the memory layout for COM objects.
Further, because COM objects are self documenting, gathering information about the real
structure of the object is easier than in the case of C++.
5.3 VARIANT Shallow Copies
When a VARIANT object is duplicated, it is typically done with VariantCopy(), but just a
simple memcpy() is also used in many cases. VariantCopy() is the preferred method, since
it will do an object-aware copy  if the VARIANT being copied is a string, it will duplicate
the memory. If the object being copied is an object, it will add a reference count. In
contrast, memcpy() obviously performs a shallow copy  if the VARIANT contains any sort
of complex object, such as an IDispatch, a pointer to the object will be duplicated and
utilized without adding an additional reference to the object. If the result of this duplicated
VARIANT is retained, the object being pointed to could be deleted, if every other instance of
that object is released. The code in Figure 54 demonstrates this vulnerable construct.
There is also a more subtle variation on the attack  this time using VariantCopy(). In
some ways, VariantCopy() can be also be considered a shallow copy operation, in that any
VARIANT that has the VT_BYREF modier will not be deep-copied; just the pointer will be
copied.
Consider the code in Figure 55. This example shows a sample ActiveX property that
simply takes a VARIANT and stores it, and optionally returns it to the user. The problem
with this code is that VariantCopy() is used rather than VariantCopyInd(). If a VARIANT
is supplied that has the type (VT_BYREF|VT_DISPATCH) for example, a simple pointer copy is
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HRESULT CMyObject :: put_MyProperty(VARIANT src)
{
HRESULT hr;
memcpy ((void *)& m_MyProperty , (void *)&src , sizeof(VARIANT ));
return S_OK;
}






memcpy(out , (void *)& m_MyProperty , sizeof(VARIANT ));
return S_OK;
}
Figure 54: Code demonstrating a shallow copy of an object
HRESULT CMyObject :: put_MyProperty(VARIANT src)
{
HRESULT hr;
VariantInit (& m_MyProperty );
















Figure 55: Code demonstrating the copy of a VT_BYREF
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performed. If the VT_DISPATCH object being pointed to is subsequently deleted, then you are
left with a VARIANT pointing to an IDispatch object that no longer exists. If an attempt to
get this property is subsequently made, the user will retrieve a VARIANT with a stale pointer,
leading to the possibility of memory corruption.
5.3.1 The ActiveX Marshaller
In order to know the exact semantics of what happens to an object when it is passed as a
parameter to an ActiveX control, you need to pay careful attention to what types the target
function is expecting. When an ActiveX function expects a VARIANT as a parameter, the
marshalling code does not do any sort of deep copy - it uses neither VariantCopy() nor
VariantCopyInd(). So, receiving VARIANTs can be particularly dangerous if they contain
COM interfaces that are operated upon beyond the method's scope. Furthermore, if an
ActiveX function allows an indirect pointer to a COM object as a parameter - that is,
(VT_BYREF|VT_DISPATCH) or equivalent, the object being referenced will have its reference
count incremented by the marshaller (and released upon function returned). So if a VARIANT
value is passed to an ActiveX control of type (VT_BYREF|VT_DISPATCH), it will not have its
reference count incremented if the function takes a VARIANT, but it will have its reference
count incremented if the function takes a IDispatch ** (or even an IDispatch *). This
algorithm is somewhat counterintuitive, which increases the likelihood that mistakes will
occur as a result.
5.3.2 Detecting Shallow Copies with Static Analysis
Detecting shallow copies of COM objects is an opportunity for future research. This could
be done with a data ow analysis similar to the ones described in Sections 5.1.4 and 6.1.3.1.
To detect a shallow copy, one could develop a data ow algorithm that determines that a
COM object is being passed to one of the many primitive memory copying operations (e.g.,
memcpy()). The interesting challenges to solve in that research would be similar to that
which we did with C++. Performing the points-to analysis to determine that the source of
the copy operation points to a COM object is a dicult task.
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5.4 COM Trust Transitivity
The previous sections described type confusion vulnerabilities that can exist in C++ and
COM as well as problems that arise when improperly copying COM objects. In this section,
we desribe how the COM architecture can be used at runtime to subvert its own underlying
security architecture.
5.4.1 Architectural Weakness
Once a COM object is installed on a system, it is available for instantiation by any applica-
tion. There is no central policy governing which applications can load which COM objects.
As vulnerabilities are disclosed in individual COM objects, there is nothing preventing an
unknowing application from loading that potentially harmful control. Given that vulnerabil-
ities in COM objects are most often left unpatched, any application that loads COM objects
is a potential target an adversary. Specically, an adversary can force an application to load
one of the previously installed and known awed controls allowing for exploitation. This
allows adversaries to take advantage of controls that already exist on a system rather than
attempting to trick their victim into installing an intentionally malicious object. Because
many of the vulnerabilities that have gone unpatched allow for the execution of arbitrary
code, an adversary can exploit these loitering aws as an initial infection vector to install
malware. Once they have installed their malware, they can gain complete control over the
system. Given this exposure, many applications have implemented their own discrete poli-
cies dictating which controls they deem to be safe or unsafe. The Internet Explorer killbit
list is an example of one such policy. These policies are only useful for determining which
COM objects will be directly loaded by an application. They cannot guarantee or enforce
the behavior of an object once it is instantiated. An application must therefore trust the
behavior of a COM object once it is loaded. If that COM object then loads other COM
objects, this trust is transitively extended. As shown in Figure 56, this trust transitivity
exposes a critical security weakness with regard to COM. If an application loads a COM
object that is within its security policy, it trusts that object to only load other objects that













Figure 56: Transitive trust between COM Objects allows normally unauthorized objects to
be loaded and executed.
There is no programmatic way for the application to ensure that an object it loads
extends its security policy to other objects. It is therefore theoretically possible to exploit
this transitive trust relationship in any application that loads COM objects. To complete
an attack exploiting this transitive trust, an adversary requires the following:
1. An application that will render adversary-controlled content.
2. An application that will load COM objects.
3. A COM object that will in turn load other COM objects.
4. A vulnerable object that can be exploited.
Each of these requirements is easily achievable under normal circumstances with an average
Windows installation. The following subsections address them in order.
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5.4.1.1 Supplying Adversary-Controlled Content
The rst requirement for accomplishing this sort of attack is that an adversary must per-
suade a target to render content under their control. This is easily accomplished through
applications like Internet Explorer and the Microsoft Oce suite. End users can be tricked
into viewing malicious web pages through a number of means including phishing, cross-site
scripting, and content injection. Additionally, users can be emailed Oce and other docu-
ments or the browser can be used to force the rendering of Oce content through the use
of ActiveX.
5.4.2 Loading Adversary-Controlled COM Objects
COM objects can be loaded based on content in Internet Explorer, the Microsoft Oce suite,
as well as any other applications and services commonly installed on Windows that make
use of this infrastructure including Flash and Adobe Reader. To force an application such
as Internet Explorer to load a COM object, an adversary can supply the CLSID parameter
of an <OBJECT> tag. In the case of the Microsoft Oce suite, COM objects can be directly
embedded in documents using the GUI.
5.4.2.1 Transitive Trust Amongst COM Objects
The third requirement for the attack is to load a COM object that will in turn load other
objects. While this may seem rare, it is actually quite prevalent due to a feature of Microsoft
Visual Studio. Because of the complexity of developing COM objects, Microsoft has included
with Visual Studio a set of C++ templates called the Active Template Library (ATL). The
ATL provides methods for the saving and loading of persistence streams so a developer does
not have to understand the low-level details. To interact with these methods the developer
simply provides a property map, a template dening the order and type of data that is stored
in the persistence stream, for the object elds they intend to save stream. This way, as the
control reads the persistence stream it understands to which properties it should apply the
data. One weakness of property maps is the ability to dene loose types. These are type
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hr = pStream ->Read(&vtRead , sizeof(VARTYPE), NULL);












hr = OleLoadFromStream(pStream ,
(vtRead == VT_UNKNOWN) ? IID_IUnknown : IID_IDispatch ,
(void **)& punkVal );




Figure 57: Source code for CComVariant::ReadFromStream()
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HRESULT OleLoadFromStream(LPSTREAM pStm ,












hr = ReadClassStm(pStm , &pclsid );
if (hr)
return hr;
hr = CoCreateInstance(pclsid , NULL , CLSCTX_NO_CODE_DOWNLOAD|
CLSCTX_REMOVE_SERVER|CLSCTX_LOCAL_SERVER|CLSCTX_INPROC_SERVER ,
riid , ppvObj );
if (hr)
return hr;














Figure 58: Approximation of OleLoadFromStream()
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speciers that do not directly map to one of the dened types. In other words, the prop-
erty map can dene that data exists in the persistence stream, but the COM object should
examine the data itself to determine its type. This is the functional equivalent of a void
pointer in the C programming language. By using the ATL, a COM developer can now easily
create a COM object which implements persistence without understanding the underlying
required methods or the COM-specic data types with which they are dealing. The critical
issue then becomes the handling of loose-typed variants by the ATL-provided methods for
loading a persistence stream. To read a persistence stream, the IPersistStream::Load()
method provided in the ATL will call the method CComVariant::ReadFromStream(). As
can be seen in the source code for CComVariant::ReadFromStream() in 57, there exist two
variant types, that if encountered in the stream, will be passed to OleLoadFromStream().
An approximation of the source of OleLoadFromStream() obtained through reverse engi-
neering the binaries is provided in 58. Here we can see that a CLSID is read from the
data stream and passed to CoCreateInstance(). The remainder of the data stream is then
passed to the IPersistStream::Load() method exposed by the object that has just been
loaded. It is important to note that at no time was a security policy consulted before calling
OleLoadFromStream(). This code distributed with the ATL can clearly be used to bypass
the security policy of the parent application.
5.4.2.2 Finding a Known Flawed Control
The nal requirement for this attack is to be able to load a vulnerable control. Given that
vulnerabilities in COM objects are generally left unpatched, several hundred known awed
controls are resident on the average Windows installation. For example, on the system used
to write this dissertation, the killbit list for Internet Explorer is over 600 entries in size.
Each of those entries corresponds to known awed control that is likely still unpatched.
5.4.3 Proof of Concept Attack
To demonstrate the severity of this attack, and the ease with which it can be accomplished
on an average Windows platform, a working example was created leveraging well-known
applications and commonly installed COM objects. The attack created for this proof of
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Figure 59: The successful exploitation of a COM Object in Microsoft Word, demonstrated
by having Word open a socket on port 4444.
concept loads a trusted COM object in Microsoft Word, which then loads a known awed
control that is still resident on most installations of Windows. The specic vulnerability used
in this example is a known awed control in all Windows XP installations and results in
the execution of arbitrary code when triggered. We note that we tested dierent vulnerable
controls on systems running Windows Vista and Windows 7 and were similarly able to
compromise those systems. In this example, the COM object executes shellcode causing
Word to listen on a TCP socket. Upon connection to this socket, the adversary is presented
with a command prompt. While this section only describes an attack against Microsoft
Word, the same attack was proven to be successful against several other COM containers
including Microsoft WordPad, Microsoft Excel, Microsoft Powerpoint and Adobe Reader.
To explain how the proof of concept attack was created, the following describes how each of
the requirements in Section 5.4.1 was met.
1. Microsoft Word was chosen as the parent application for our proof of concept attack.
Microsoft Word documents can be easily emailed to users. Additionally, the browser
can be used as an intermediary in this attack by providing a link to a .doc le or using
ActiveX to force Word to open a document of the adversary's choosing.
2. Microsoft Word was chosen for the ease with which COM objects can be embedded
in documents. Object insertion is something that is done regularly in the course of
authoring a document. This typically comes in the form of inserting images, tables,
etc. In many cases these operations are actually embedding COM objects. This same
process can be used to insert objects of many dierent types as long as they conform
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Figure 60: Pop-up Warning from Microsoft Word When Attempting to Instantiate an Out-
of-Policy Control
to the Microsoft Word security policy.
3. The Microsoft Date and Time Picker control was chosen because it provides the func-
tionality to load subsequent COM objects by providing a CLSID in a persistence
stream.
4. The nal requirement for constructing the attack is to have the COM object loaded in
the previous step then load a known vulnerable control. We selected Microsoft's Helper
Object for Java, which contains a long standing, unpatched, exploitable vulnerability
reachable by instantiating the control outside the Microsoft Java Virtual Machine.
To summarize, we create a working exploit by crafting a Microsoft Word document
containing the embedded benign Microsoft Date and Time Picker control. That COM
object in turn loads a known awed control, thus circumventing Word's COM security
policy. Once the awed control is loaded, it triggers the vulnerability, resulting in the
execution of arbitrary code. This attack, if executed in the real world, would easily enable
an adversary to take full control of a victim's workstation to install malware or use the
system for other arbitrarily malicious purposes. The known vulnerable COM object loaded
in this attack is listed in the Internet Explorer killbit list. As such, it is the policy of
Microsoft Word to not load this control. Had the attack simply tried to embed the control
directly in the Word document, the security policy would have been eective, and the user
would have been presented with the dialog shown in Figure 60. While the eectiveness
of such warning messages is debatable, our attack allows for the vulnerable control to be
loaded without providing the user with any indication that something is amiss. As shown
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in Figure 59, by using a trusted COM object to load the known awed control, the security
policy is bypassed, and the winword.exe process is now listening on TCP port 4444. This is
demonstrable evidence that Microsoft Word has been compromised. In our specic exploit,
upon connecting to the socket, the adversary is presented with a command prompt. This
allows for the execution of any command in the security context of the user viewing the
Word document. In a real attack scenario, an adversary would generally then go on to
install their malware  taking complete control of the system.
5.4.4 Breadth of Attack
The attack described above is not unique to Microsoft Word, the Microsoft Date and Time
Picker, and the Helper Object for Java. On the average Windows-based system, there are a
large number of applications that would meet the rst and second criteria for exploitation.
In our testing, identied dozens of COM objects that exist on an average system that were
either compiled with the ATL or expose functionally equivalent capability. As previously
mentioned, the Windows XP-based system used to write this dissertation has several hundred
known awed controls still installed. This system is not unique. Given these numbers,
the permutations of application, trusted COM object, and untrusted COM object quickly
become unmanageably large. It is therefore unrealistic to require each application to attempt
to main-tain security policies that can reasonably deal with this threat. It is clear that
Windows requires an operating system-level security policy governing the instantiation of
COM objects.
5.4.5 Preventing COM Trust Transitvity With Runtime Enforcement
In this section, we describe a solution we developed known as COMBlocker. This is a runtime
enforcement system that provides a comprehensive view of COM instantiation allowing for
complete mediation as compared to the relatively limited killbit methodology.
5.4.5.1 Mitigation Architecture
The lack of a central security policy governing the instantiation of COM objects has been
identied as a major source of vulnerability in this work. In this section, a prototype of a
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mechanism which we call COMBlocker is proposed that introduces an operating system-level
security policy with reference monitor-like functionality. This system will be used to enforce
a security policy on the instantiation of all COM objects.
Design Goals and Assumptions The goal of COMBlocker is to provide a system-level
policy for the instantiation of all COM objects. If every instantiation is monitored by a
central policy, the issue of transitive trust can be remedied. The design of COMBlocker as-
sumes that it is attempting to prevent the initial infection vector described in the previous
section. It is not designed to secure a previously infected machine. Additionally, the preven-
tion mechanism is designed to secure the instantiation of COM objects by applications that
conform to Microsoft's design model. This is not intended to prevent intentionally malicious
applications from loading awed controls. These assumptions follow a common theme: the
goal is to prevent the initial attack.
High Level Architecture COMBlocker is designed to interpose itself in the instan-
tiation of all COM objects. In terms of the attack described in Section 5.4.1, the COM
object loaded by Microsoft Word would be matched against a security policy and when that
COM object in turn attempts to load another COM object, that subsequent instantiation
would also be checked against the policy. To create such a policy enforcement system, the
instantiation logic must be injected into every process on the system. This can be accom-
plished by a number of methods with varying levels of complexity and completeness. For
reasons detailed later, COMBlocker injects a dynamically-linked library into every running
process. This library contains the logic required to enforce the security policy. Once the
COMBlocker library is injected into every process, calls to the COM instantiation APIs
need to be redirected to the library to verify any object being loaded. We accomplish this
through binary patching in our prototype. As the COMBlocker library is loaded, it locates
the four COM instantiation APIs and overwrites the function prolog with a jump to the
policy verication code. With the binary hooks in place, any application that calls any of
the COM instantiation APIs is redirected to the security interface. This redirection will
take place regardless of the source of the call to the instantiation API. In other words, the
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call to load a COM object could come from a base executable, a library, a dierent COM
object, or any other type of executable code. Any call to any of the instantiation APIs is
veried against our security policy. Once we can verify the instantiation of an object, a
suitable policy must be dened. For the sake of simplicity our proof of concept starts by
allowing the user to apply the Internet Explorer killbit list to all COM object instantiations.
From there, a user can create exceptions to the killbit list or add disallowed objects on a
per-application or system-wide basis.
5.4.5.2 Detailed Architecture
COMBlocker was developed as a third-party add-on for Microsoft Windows. It is not imple-
mented by changing the underlying COM architecture or by invoking any extended APIs. If
Microsoft were to implement a similar system, they could simply change the COM instanti-
ation APIs to always check a central policy. The proof of concept developed in this research
is a prototype of a system that a third-party could implement to provide a central COM
security policy. With that, the details of how the solution was implemented are covered for
completeness.
DLL Injection To introduce the security policy verication code into every running
process, COMBlocker uses DLL injection. This is the process by which an application forces
another application to load a DLL of its choosing. There are several ways to inject a DLL
into another process, but since our solution requires injection into every process, we chose to
use the AppInit_DLLs registry key [56]. The operating system will load all DLL's specied
in this key into every process, thereby providing comprehensive coverage for all applications.
Binary Hooking Once the library is injected into every process, control ow from the
COM instantiation APIs must be redirected to the COMBlocker security policy. Our proof
of concept accomplishes this redirection through binary patching. The binary patching used
by COMBlocker is very similar to the Detours API created by Microsoft Research [40]. In
the case of COMBlocker, the function prolog of every COM instantiation API is overwritten
with code that will jump to the security policy verication code in our library. As part of
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Figure 61: Hooking Architecture for COMBlocker. Using binary rewriting, we force all
COM objects to be checked against the global policy at their instantiation. Note on the left
the policy check  call AlertCLSID; test eax, eax;
the DLLMain() function, our library will locate the four instantiation APIs and overwrite
the rst ve bytes of the function prolog with a jump to the code that implements the policy
verication. Since the rst ve bytes of the function have been overwritten, the rst few
instructions of the policy verication code must reproduce the functionality of the original
API. Once these instructions are executed, the security policy enforcement can commence.
Figure 61 shows the interception of control ow by COMBlocker to check against a global
policy.
Enforcement Logic Once the control ow has been redirected from the instantiation
APIs to our own logic, we then have access to the arguments to those APIs. This provides us
with the necessary information to create an enforcement policy. Specically, the CLSID of
the object being instantiated is passed to the instantiation APIs as the rst argument. In our
enforcement logic, we retrieve a pointer to the CLSID from the stack of the instantiation API.
If the CLSID is specically blocked by the security policy in the registry, the enforcement
logic simply returns the error REGDB_E_CLASSNOTREG to the calling application. This returns
an invalid handle that the calling application cannot use for interacting with the object. All
applications tested gracefully handled this error condition, but if one did not, it would crash
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rather than allowing the exploit to continue.
Policy Denition In COMBlocker, we wished to have a simple starting point to dene
the security policy. As such, the Internet Explorer killbit list can be applied to any applica-
tion on the system or to the system as a whole. This is accomplished by setting a value in
the registry in a location created by COMBlocker. The enforcement logic checks to see if this
value is set. If it is, the killbit list is read from its default location in the registry and used
for comparison against the CLSID the application is attempting to load. It is important to
note that this is dierent than the security policy currently employed by Microsoft Word. In
Word, the policy is only applied to the objects instantiated by the base executable. In our
system, all instantiations are monitored. Once the killbit list is applied to an application,
exemptions or additions to the list can be manually entered. These modications are also set
in the COMBlocker registry hive. For each application, subkeys in the registry are used to
dene by CLSID which objects are speci- cally allowed or specically denied. This allows
the user to create detailed white lists and black lists for every application or the system as
a whole. As mentioned in Section 5.4.4, it is unrealistic for a user to try to maintain lists of
controls that should be considered secure and insecure. As such, it is the vision for a system
like this to be implemented by Microsoft or a third party vendor. In these cases, Microsoft
(or the vendor) could keep track of the known awed controls and ensure they cannot be
instantiated by any application except those specically requiring them. Additionally, ap-
plications could be proled to enumerate only those controls that should be instantiated
under normal operation. In cases where this is possible, detailed white lists could also be
created.
5.4.5.3 Results and Discussion
Breadth of Vulnerability The rst objective described in this dissertation was to deter-
mine the breadth of the vulnerability. The issue of transitive trust amongst COM objects was
hypothesized to exist in all COM containers which load content provided by a third party.
This proved to be true for every application that was tested. Throughout the research, the
attack described in Section 5.4.1 was reproduced in Microsoft WordPad, Microsoft Excel,
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Figure 62: COMBlocker Successfully Stopping Instantiation
Microsoft Powerpoint and Adobe Reader. The question of how additional third party COM
containers might behave was also approximated. Microsoft Visual Studio 6 ships with a
utility called the ActiveX Control Test Container. This utility allows developers to test
the functionality of COM objects without having to create their own COM container. This
loosely represents how a generic COM container would behave under normal circumstances.
The attack from Section 5.4.1 was also successful in this tool, meaning that a signicant
number of other third-party applications are also vulnerable to these attacks. Each applica-
tion tested was coerced into loading a COM object that was in direct violation of its security
policy (where one exists). Generally speaking, these security policies are used to prevent the
instantiation of COM objects that are known to contain vulnerabilities. In many cases, these
security policies are used in lieu of xing the vulnerabilities. With the research presented in
this work, each of the loitering vulnerabilities in those controls can be resurrected and used
for successful compromise.
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Eectiveness of the Solution We tested COMBlocker's eectiveness and measured the
overhead it imposes on a standard desktop system. The rst step in testing the eectiveness
of the solution was to apply it to each of the applications that were found to be vulnerable
in the section above. For each application that was shown to be vulnerable, COMBlocker
presented the user with the dialog box shown in Figure 62. This dialog box shows that
the application attempted to load a control that is specically denied by the dened policy.
It also indicates that the instantiation of the object was prevented. COMBlocker was suc-
cessfully able to prevent the attack described in Section 5.4.1 in Microsoft WordPad, Word,
Excel, and PowerPoint as well as the ActiveX Control Test Container. Demonstrating the
formal completeness of our solution is dicult. Our mechanism is helped by the fact that
there are only a small number of publicly knownmeans by which COM objects can be in-
stantiated. Injecting COMBlocker at these points should logically prevent applications from
circumventing policy enforcement. However, if applications can instantiate COM objects
through other unknown means such as implementing their own APIs, these interfaces would
also need to be modied and mediated.
Performance A version of COMBlocker was created that logged the time required for
each policy lookup encountered throughout the operation of an application. The test build
was installed on a typical development workstation and gathered information for all of the
COM object instantiations that occurred during a single day as part of a developer's normal
work. The test workstation was a Windows XP SP3 machine with Oce 2007, Internet
Explorer 7, Firefox 3, Lotus Notes 8, Visual Studio 6, and several other commonly installed
applications. During the course of the day, the behavior of the developer caused over 65,000
COM instantiations. Each of these recorded an average policy lookup time of 554µs to
complete, with a 95% condence interval of ±104µs. The variation in lookup time is largely
due to the fact that consulting the killbit list in the registry is accomplished through a
linear scan of the subkeys; it is not indexed. Testing shows that an average application
incurs less than 10 policy lookups per user action. With that, each user action generates
less than 5ms of delay due to COMBlocker. Another data point gathered in this test is
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that in general, Oce applications and web browsers incurred a lower lookup time than core
operating system components. When the data set is reduced to only Of- ce applications
and web browsers, the average lookup time drops to 104µs, with a 95% condence interval
of ±14.2µs. This indicates that if performance were an issue in implementing a system like
COMBlocker, the scope of the protection could be reduced to only those applications that
are more easily targeted in COM-based attacks.
Discussion on Policy Creation As mentioned in Section 5.4, the base policy for each
application (or the system as a whole) was the Internet Explorer killbit list. It appears
that over time, several COM objects required for the normal operation of many of the
applications tested have been killbitted. In other words, there exist several COM objects
that are critical to the operation of Microsoft Word, Excel, and even Internet Explorer
that are in the killbit list. The question arises: How can COM objects critical to Internet
Explorer end up in the killbit list? The answer is that the killbit list blocks the instantiation
of COM objects by the IE scripting engines, not the base IE executable. An example of
this occurred when COMBlocker applied the killbit list to Internet Explorer as a whole, the
navigation bar was prevented from being instantiated. The takeaway from this result of the
testing is that the killbit list cannot be blindly applied to every application or the system as
a whole. As policies are created, the killbit list can be used as a base, but modications are
required for each application being monitored. Any entity choosing to provide a solution
like COMBlocker must take great care to ensure the security policies they dene will allow
for the normal operation of each monitored application while still providing a suitable level
of security.
Future Enhancements to COMBlocker As mentioned above, policy creation can be
quite complex. While the killbit list is a good starting point for a blacklist, it simply does not
apply as-is to every application on the system. A useful enhancement to COMBlocker (or an
accompanying tool) would be one that allows for the proling of applications under normal
use. This would help to expedite the identication of controls listed in the killbit list that
are critical to the operation of other applications. Additionally, more research is required
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to determine the feasibility of runtime analysis of persistence streams. It could be possible
to analyze data contained in a persistence stream and lter access to that data based on
policy. For example, one policy could be to ensure that COM objects may only load simple
data types and cannot load the more complex types, which could force the instantiation of
other objects.
Comparsion to Microsoft-Issued Patch On June 8, 2010, Microsoft released Security
Bulletin MS10-036 in response to our private disclosure of this vulnerability. This patch at-
tempts to prevent the attacks discovered and demonstrated in this dissertation. Specically,
this patch extends the killbit list to nested COM instantiations made by Microsoft Oce.
While this patch eectively prevents Oce-generated les from including these attacks, it
does not protect any other application that takes advantage of the COM infrastructure. Ac-
cordingly, this patch does not provide the security guarantees of COMBlocker, and therefore





In the previous two chapters, we discussed the sorts of security issues that can arise with
complex object types during the instantiation and lifetime of the object. In this chapter, we
discuss the sorts of issues that can arise as the objects are deleted.
6.1 C++ Use-After-Free Conditions
In this chapter, we present a static analysis technique to detect use-after-free conditions
in compiled binaries. Because the structure of how C++ objects are compiled and stored
in memory is crucial to both the understanding of use-after-free vulnerabilities as well as
analysis of C++ binaries, we give a brief description of how C++ objects are represented
after compilation. We then give a short description of how use-after-free vulnerabilities occur
in code and how they are exploited. We conclude this background section with a review of
available expression analysis from compiler theory.
6.1.1 C++ Objects in Memory
One of the tasks of a C++ compiler is to ensure the correct storage of C++ classes in
memory while providing both multiple inheritance and virtual functions. C++ compilers
store instantiated objects as contiguous structures in memory. This is fortunate because it
simplies the discovery of object instantiations in compiled binaries. Our discussion here is
focused on how Visual Studio compiles C++; other compilers represent C++ objects in a
similar manner. Classes without virtual functions are represented in memory like traditional
C structs. Simply, the properties (data members) of the object are placed in contiguous
memory in order of declaration in the code. The object's method calls are compiled as
direct calls to functions that take a pointer to the object as an argument (the this pointer).
When an object has one or more virtual functions, virtual function calls must be dispatched
at runtime through the use of a virtual function table (vtable). A vtable for an object
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is a contiguous set of function pointers that point to the appropriate functions for that
object type. The virtual function can be called by nding the correct function pointer in
the function pointer table. Objects with virtual methods are laid out in memory the same
way as objects without virtual methods, but have an initial member element: a pointer to
the class's vtable. This is a pointer to an array of function pointers (one for each virtual
funciton) stored in the read-only .data section of the binary. When a class inherits from
a single base class, the class instance begins with a vtable pointer, followed by the base
object properties and then the derived object properties. When a class inherits from more
than one class, the base class layouts are placed consecutively, with the derived class's data
members following. Classes that are the result of multiple inheritance have more than one
vtableone for each base class. Virtual methods from the derived class will be appended
to the vtable for the rst base class. The memory structures described above are created on
the stack or the heap by the class constructor depending on how the object is allocated in
the source code. The compiler may also choose to make the constructors inline or create a
sepa-
Note that the presence of a command line argument at line 18 causes object a to be
deleted, even though it is called again at line 26. rate function call for the constructor. In
Visual Studio, this is a congurable optimization that can be set by the developer.
6.1.2 Use-After-Free Vulnerabilities
Use-after-free (UAF) vulnerabilities are a class of software aws that involve using a memory
resident object after it has been freed. While, use-after-free conditions are possible and
prevalent in C, they are reported as security vulnerabilities more frequently in C++. UAF
vulnerabilities most commonly occur when a C++ object that was allocated on the heap
is accessed after it is deleted, but stack-allocated objects can also be used after a free.
Developers can easily make this memory management error, especially in large and complex
codebases, and often in an attempt to prevent memory leaks. This creates a condition
where an object is deleted on some code paths, but not all. The code in Figure 63 provides








virtual void addRef ();
virtual void print ();
};
int main(int argc , char* argv [])
{
A *a = new A;
a->addRef ();
a->print ();









Figure 63: Sample C++ code with a use-after-free vulnerability.
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command line argument is 1, but needed the object under all other conditions. If an
attacker can cause the program to take the rst branch, the object is deleted, but then
is used later in the program. When an object is deleted, new data takes the place of the
previously deleted object's properties and/or vtable pointer. Later, if the deleted object's
property is accessed, this new data could be read or modied, aecting the reliable operation
of the program. If a deleted object's virtual method is called, whatever data has been written
to the old vtable pointer will be dereferenced to locate the correct function pointer. This
can result in memory access violations or otherwise unstable execution. In addition to the
hazards of a normally functioning program with a use-after-free condition, it can also be
a path to software exploitation. While a use-after-free can result in an attacker with the
ability to write data to the stack or heap to inuence decisions made based on an object's
properties, the greatest danger is if the use-after-free includes a virtual function call. In
that case, the attacker can write his own vtable containing pointers to shellcode and ll
the deleted object's memory with references to that vtable. On the virtual function call,
execution will transfer to the attacker's injected code. Figure 64 demonstrates a use-after-
free exploit of the code shown in Figure 63. The left side of Figure 64 shows a fragment of the
compiled code from Figure 63. That fragment completes with a call to the virtual function
print() at line 413BC2. The object pointer is consulted to nd the pointer to the vtable at
line 413BB9. At runtime, the object is stored on the heap  in this example, the object is
stored at address 11001000, and the class's vtable is located at address 416740. The function
pointer stored at oset 4 represents the second virtual function declared in the class (since
function pointers are 4 bytes each). If this object were overwritten using a use-after-free
vulnerability, and the attacker could control the value of the data at the heap location where
the object was stored (which in many cases is not dicult), the attacker could overwrite
the vtable pointer with a pointer to the attacker's own vtable. The bottom half of Figure
64 shows this scenario with gray boxes. In that example, the attacker has established a
vtable pointer of 12001000 (also heap data written by the attacker) and has preloaded
that location with function pointers to malicious functions (again, written by the attacker).





































Figure 64: Memory layout of a valid object and after a use-after-free exploit
ATTACKER_FUNCTION_2 instead of address dd offset j_A_print. Unfortunately, compilers
fail to detect use-after-free vulnerabilities. Not only do they miss complex aws that are the
result of interprocedural memory management, they also miss trivial examples like the one
in Figure 63. Visual Studio 2012, g++ 4.8.3, and clang++ 3.5 all fail to detect the aw in
that exact code sample.
6.1.3 Detecting Use-After-Free Conditions With Static Analysis
6.1.3.1 Available Expression Analysis
Available expression analysis (abbreviated AVAIL) is a common compiler data ow analysis
that enables common subexpression elimination. AVAIL takes as input a control ow graph
consisting of basic blocks, and AVAIL identies, for each basic block, a set of expressions
that will always be computed before the entry of a given basic block. Knowing the set of
expressions that are always computed before a basic block allows a compiler to set aside re-
sults to avoid redundant computation (specically, common subexpressions). While AVAIL
is usually presented as a local (within a single procedure) algorithm, interprocedural avail-
able expression analysis is also possible. More specically, AVAIL computes four sets for
each basic block B: GEN [B], KILL[B], AV AILIN [B], and AV AILOUT [B]. AV AILIN
and AV AILOUT refer to the expressions that are available before and after each block (re-
spectively). GEN is the set of new expressions that are dened in the basic block, and
KILL is the set of expressions whose values have changed because a variable used in the
expression has changed. These sets are computed with the following two relations:
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AV AILIN [B] =
⋂
p proceeds B
AV AILOUT [p] (3)
AV AILOUT [B] = GEN [B] ∪ (AV AILIN [B]−KILL[b]) (4)
where p is a basic block (that proceeds a block B). In our analysis, objects must be
tracked interprocedurally. In those cases, AV AILIN at the entry of a function F is equal
to AV AILOUT at the call site to F from a call site c. Within a basic block, we say that an
expression is in the AV AILset at an execution point a if it has been generated before a, or
if the expression is in AV AILIN and not killed before point a. These relations, when written
for every basic block, form a system of equations. Because the control ow graph contains
back-edges (from loops and other control structures), and thus blocks can be aected by
both preceding and subsequent blocks, solving the system of equations requires a xed-point
algorithm (that runs through each block iteratively until the four sets for every block do not
change). The recurrence relationship described above forms the basis of many other data
ow analysis algorithms, with slightly dierent denitions of IN , OUT , GEN , KILL, and
the socalled meet operator, which in the case of AV AIL is set union. In this work, we
dene a new data-ow analysis algorithm in the following section. Our algorithm uses the
same recurrences above, but with new denitions of GEN and KILL that allow us to track
object instantiation and deletion rather than availability of expressions.
6.1.3.2 Available Object Denition Analysis
As discussed in the previous section, use-after-free vulnerabilities occur when an object is
accessed after being freed. Frequently, the object is freed along some code paths, but not
others. Accordingly, use-after-free errors can be detected by nding every access where
the object may have been deleted on some proceeding code path. Thus, an analysis that
determines if all code paths to an access contain a valid object denition will detect use-
after-free conditions. In this section, we dene such an analysis and term it Available
Object Denition Analysis (AODA). Our crucial insight is that the recurrence relations
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from AV AIL can be used to track the availability of instantiated objects to detect use-
after-free errors. To track instantiated objects, we simply need to redene how the GEN
and KILL sets are populated during the analysis. We will use the same notation for these
sets, but note their alternative meanings in AODA. In AODA, GEN is the set of objects
that are instantiated in a basic block, while KILL is the set of objects that are freed in a
basic block. AV AILIN is simply the set of objects that are instantiated (and thus, available)
along all code paths before a basic block, while AV AILOUT are the objects that are available
after a basic block has executed. Tracking all instantiated class pointers is signicantly more
dicult than tracking expressions. The following section details how we reliably compute
the GEN and KILL sets. Given GEN and KILL, computing AV AILIN and AV AILOUT
requires a straightforward application of iteration over the control ow graph. We rely on
the Recall framework to compute the control ow graph, and identify object instantiations
and deletions. Although in this work we evaluate AODA on compiled binaries, as a data
ow algorithm it can also be implemented within a compiler or within a stand-alone static
analysis tool.
6.1.3.3 Implementation
In this section, we describe how we extended the Recall binary analysis framework to
implement AODA. This section includes the technical details involved in identifying object
instantiation, usage, and deletion. In the following section, we use this implementation to
detect use-after-free conditions in several test applications adapted from pubilcly available
projects as well as 652 MicrosoftWindows libaries and a previously disclosed use-after-free
vulnerability.
Assumptions This research focuses on the common and important problem of identify-
ing software vulnerabilities in compiled code. Because we focus on commercially available,
release-build code, we make no claims about the applicability of our algorithms or imple-
mentation to malware or other hardened, obfuscated code. We chose to focus on Windows
binaries compiled to x86 by Microsoft Visual Studio for this work. We chose this platform
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because the majority of closed-source software (which requires binary analysis) is imple-
mented for that platform. While our platform choice inuences our implementation and
choice of experimental targets, the techniques we present will be applicable to any x86 bi-
nary format and compiler choice. For the sake of generality, we assume that Runtime Type
Information (RTTI) is unavailable to the analysis. If this information is available, it can
only make object detection (and our subsequent analysis) more accurate.
Identifying object instantiation and deletion To compute GEN for AODA, we must
identify every object instantiation, and to compute KILL for AODA we must identify every
object deletion. When C++ code is compiled, the clear type denitions in the source code
become calls to relevant constructors that create the memory objects described in Section
6.1.1, and accordingly are non-trivial to identify. We rely on Recall's ClassTracker to
identify C++ object creation and deletion with high reliability. Recall uses four simple,
reliable heuristics to identify C++ objects that reect all possible ways a C++ object can
be instantiated at runtime: Stack-allocated object with in-line constructor Heap-allocated
object with in-line constructor Stack-allocated object with called constructor Heap-allocated
object with called constructor The heuristics for detecting heap objects rely on the com-
piler's use of a specic function for the new operator. In the case of Visual Studio, after
compilation this function is referred to as YAPAXI. Once an object instantiation is located,
Recall discovers an object's type by tracing the size of the new vtable and set of funtion
pointers as well as the number and size of the properties of the object. When a new object
is encountered, the virtual address of the constructor of the object is used as an opaque
identier for that object type. We extend Recall to also detect object deletion. Deletion
detection also diers between stack and heap declared objects. Stack-alloocated objects are
deleted by rst calling the object's destructor, then calling a delete operator (named YAXPAX
Visual Studio after compilation). The compiler automatically deletes stack-declared objects
when they fall out of scope. Heap-allocated objects are deleted only when the developer
makes an explicit call to delete. When this occurs, Visual Studio creates a helper function
that calls the object's destructor and the delete function YAXPAX. The name of the helper
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function will include the string scalar deleting destructor or vector deleting destructor de-
pending on whether the developer calls delete or delete[], respectively. In the case of
heap-allocated objects, to ensure correctness Recall traverses into the helper function to
ensure that the class destructor is called and that there is an explicit call to YAXPAX. Recall
detects deletion of both types of object. In particular, because heap object deletion is so
distinctive, we are highly condent in our ability to detect deleted objects on the heap.
Complex Real-World Scenarios While the basic concept of how AODA is able to
identify object instantiations and deletions is covered above, in practice, developers employ
many variations on this concept that complicate the analysis. The details of some of the
more complex, real-world scenarios we identied are covered in the following subsections.
Virtual Destructors A developer may choose to declare the destructor for a class as
virtual. This is important if the developer encounters a scenario where they wish to delete
an instance of a derived class through a pointer to a base class. This however, introduces
complexity for AODA. The problem is that when performing the data ow analysis, there is
no clear call to the destructor for the object. Rather, an indirect function call is inserted into
the binary. The structure of the object must be fully recovered to gain an understanding
of what that indirect function call is doing. We use the Recall framework to reconstruct
the vtable of the object. Then, any indirect function call encountered during the data ow
analysis is reconciled to its actual function, and further analyzed to determine whether it
is actually the destructor for the object. Of course, following every indirect function call
during the analysis can cause the runtime of the analysis to grow exponentially. To combat
this issue, AODA takes a conguration parameter to dene how deeply it should follow the
indirect calls to look for the destructor. In practice, we found that a depth of one is sucient
to nd virtual destructors. To further limit the impact of following indirect function calls,
this traversal only occurs for functions which employ the thiscall calling convention (i.e.,
one that passes the this pointer as an argument in the ecx register). This ensures that
the indirect function call is, in fact, a call to a class method and not some other arbitrary
function.
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Factory Design Pattern Much like virtual destructors require AODA to traverse func-
tion calls to identify a destructor, the factory design pattern requires AODA to traverse
function calls to identify the instantiation of new objects. The factory design pattern is a
common object-oriented design construct in which the developer creates a method which will
instantiate diering objects based on the arguments specied. When this design pattern is
used, the constructor for the object is not directly encountered during the data ow analysis.
Rather, AODA must follow function calls to determine whether the returned value is a class
pointer. In the same way AODA takes an argument to specify the depth to which it should
traverse indirect calls to nd destructors, the depth of function calls to be traversed to nd
constructors is congurable. Again, in practice, a depth of one was found to be sucient.
However, it is more dicult to limit the functions that will be traversed to nd instanti-
ated objects. When the constructor depth is set to one, it will follow every function call
encountered during the data ow analysis to determine whether a class pointer is returned.
Computing AODA and Finding Use-After- Free vulnerabilities The second pass
made by Recall over the intermediate representation performs the xed point availability
analysis algorithm described in Section 6.1.3.1. In this pass, it performs a forward analysis
iterating over each basic block. As object instantiation points are identied, the virtual
address of the constructor is added to the GEN set for the given basic block. As object
deletion points are identied, objects are added to the KILL set. The analysis identies
which particular object is deleted by following the use-def chain to locate its instantation. As
Recall iterates to the next basic block, the objects in all the AV AILOUT sets of the block's
predecessors are added to the AV AILIN set for the current block. This process is repeated
in a xed-point algorithm until AV AILIN and AV AILOUT sets have been generated for
each basic block. In the third pass over the code, Recall identies usage points of binary
objects by using a forward analysis that iterates over each basic block in the IR. In each
basic block, Recall looks for indirect function calls  calls to function pointers that are
dereferenced from a larger containing data structure (i.e., a vtable). When Recall identies
this condition, it traverses the use-def chain of the function pointer backwards to identify
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the instantiation point of the containing structure. If the instantiation point can be traced
back to an object instantiation detected in the rst pass, Recall then determines whether
the virtual address of the call to that object's constructor is present in the AV AIL set for
the basic block at the program point where the usage occurs. If the call to the object's
constructor is not present in the AV AIL set for the basic block where the usage occurs, a
potential use-after-free condition has been discovered.
6.1.3.4 Results
After implementing the Availabile Object Denition Analysis described in Section 6.1.3.1, we
tested the framework on a series of simple examples to ensure the algorithm was operating
correctly. The process used for testing and the results of the tests are detailed in Section
6.1.3.4. Then, use-after-free conditions were injected into several publicly available projects
as detailed in Section 6.1.3.4. By scanning these projects, we ensure that our analysis
is correct for real-world applications. To ensure the analysis would work on a real-world
vulnerability, it was run against a library with a known use-afterfree vulnerability. Section
6.1.3.4 details how the results of the analysis were veried. Once we veried the results on
a control set of binaries, the framework was run over a substantial subset of the .dll's in the
system32 directory on a default install ofWindows 7. Section 6.1.3.4 details the number of
use-after-free conditions that exist unpatched on one of the world's most popular operating
systems.
Control Set Results The rst step in verifying the Available Object Denition Analysis
was to test it on a series of simple examples and manually verify the results. An example of
one of the simple examples can be found in Figure 63. This example code was compiled and
then run through RECALL, which generated an LLVM bitcode le. The control ow graph
of the resulting bitcode can be seen in Figure 65 (some code is omitted). Here we can see
the object a is instantiated in basic block 413b20 (denoted as 1 in Figure 65). We can then
see that the object is deleted in basic block 413c0b (denoted as 2 in Figure 65). Then the
object is used in basic block 413c2a (denoted as 3 in Figure 65). However, since there is a
path to 413c2a whereby the object is deleted, we have a potential use-afterfree vulnerability.
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413b20:
%5 = call i32 @"j_??2@YAPAXI@Z_0"() 
store i32 %5, i32* %this
store i32 0, i32* %var_4
%6 = load i32* %this
13b7d:
%58 = load i32* %this
%59 = call i32 @"j_?0A@@QAE@XZ"() 
store i32 %59, i32* %var_10C
413b90:
store i32 0, i32* %var_10C 
br label %"413b9a"
413b9a:
%9 = load i32* %var_10C
store i32 %9, i32* %var_104 
store i32 -1, i32* %var_4
%10 = load i32* %var_104
store i32 %10, i32* %a
%19 = inttoptr i32 %18 to i32 ()* 
%20 = call i32 %19()
413c2a:
%42 = load i32* %a
%43 = inttoptr i32 8 to i32*
%44 = getelementptr i32* %43, i32 %41 
%45 = load i32* %44
%46 = inttoptr i32 %45 to i32 ()*
%47 = call i32 %46()
413bed:
%51 = load i32* %a
store i32 %51, i32* %var_E0 
%52 = load i32* %var_E0 
store i32 %52, i32* %var_EC
413c20:
store i32 0, i32* %var_10C 
br label %"413c2a"
413c0b:
%56 = load i32* %var_EC
%57 = call i32 @"j_??_GA@@QAEPAXI@Z"() 




Figure 65: Control ow graph of code from Figure 63. At point 1, the object a is declared.
At point 2, the object is deleted. At point 3, a->print() is called again. Note that because
point 3 is reachable via point 2, a use-after-free vulnerability is possible.
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Processing Function: _main(i32 , i*)
Processing Basic Block: 413 b20
Avail_in = {}
Avail_out = {j_??0 A@@QAE@X} ## 1 ##
Processing Basic Block: 413 b7d
Avail_in = {j_??0 A@@QAE@X}
Avail_out = {j_??0 A@@QAE@X}
Processing Basic Block: 413 c2a
Avail_in = {} ## 3 ##
Avail_out = {}
Processing Basic Block: 413 bed
Avail_in = {j_??0 A@@QAE@X}
Avail_out = {j_??0 A@@QAE@X}
Processing Basic Block: 413 c0b
Avail_in = {j_??0 A@@QAE@X} ## 2 ##
Avail_out = {}
Processing Basic Block: return
Avail_in = {}
Avail_out = {}
Avail sets complete ...
Processing Basic Block: 413 b90
Processing Basic Block: 413 b9a
Found use of: j_??0 A@@QAE@X
In Avail Set...
Found use of: j_??0 A@@QAE@X
In Avail Set...
Processing Basic Block: 413 c2a
Found use of: j_??0 A@@QAE@X
ERROR - Not in Avail Set ...
Potential Use After Free Condition
Processing Basic Block: 413 bed
Processing Basic Block: return
Figure 66: AODA results show that compiled code of Figure 63 contains a use-after-free
vulnerability
Avail sets complete ...
Processing Basic Block: ed0c85e
Processing Basic Block: ed0c877
Processing Basic Block: ed0c881
Processing Basic Block: ed0c887
Processing Basic Block: ed0c883
Processing Basic Block: ed0c8aa
Processing Basic Block: ed0c8b6
Processing Basic Block: ed0c8f5
Processing Basic Block: ed0c8ff
Processing Basic Block: ed0c902
Processing Basic Block: ed0c8f9
Found use of: ??0 CEditSession@@QAE@P6GJKPAV0@@Z@Z
ERROR - Not in Avail Set ...
Potential Use After Free Condition
Figure 67: AODA results detect use of an object that is not in the AV AIL set in a previously-
disclosed vulnerability
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Table 5: Github projects with injected vulnerabilities










When AODA is run on the control ow graph in Figure 65, it automates the detection
logic described above. It does this in two passes over the code. The rst pass identies the
AV AIL sets as shown in Figure 66. The most notable points of the rst pass are where
the analysis detects the generation of a new object in basic block 413b20 (denoted as 1 in
Figure 66), and where it detects an object being killed in basic block 413c0b (denoted as
2 in Figure 66). Then, since basic block 413c2a has three predecessors, and the required
object is not in the AV AILOUT sets for all of the preceding basic blocks, it is not added
to the AV AILIN set (denoted as 3 in Figure 66). The second pass over the code looks
for uses of objects. It checks to make sure that the class pointer that is referenced is in fact
in the AV AILIN set of the containing basic block. In the case of the code in Figure 65,
the statement %47 = call i32 %46() makes use of an object that is not contained in the
AV AILIN set (denoted as ERROR in Figure 66). Since, there exists a control ow path
where the object is not available, a use-after-free condition exists at this program point.
In addition to the code in Figure 63, we tested six other test cases involving use-after-free
with various control structures. These tested if-else statements, switch statements, goto
statements, and switches combined with if-else and goto, and a switch with an accidental
fall through.
Manually Generated Vulnerabilities To further test the detection capabilities of
Available Object Denition Analysis, it was tested on a series of publicly available projects.
128
To nd suitable projects, we used a script to identify projects on Github that included Vi-
sual Studio project les and made use of heap-allocated objects. Of the rst 1000 projects
found on Github, 66 met both of those conditions. We selected the rst nine projects that
would build with minimal modication and injected vulnerabilities into the source. The
vulnerabilities were injected using one of two methods. The rst is by freeing objects that
had been allocated by the original author. By using objects that were dened by the original
author, and only injecting deletions of those objects, we encountered several real-world sce-
narios that were not seen in our control set tests described above. For example, the Leanify1
project makes use of the factory design pattern and virtual destructors. As described in
Section 6.1.3.3, these conditions make detection of use-after-free conditions more dicult.
The second method for injecting use-after-free conditions is by deleting return statements
that would cause the use of a freed object to be unreachable. After injecting the vulnera-
bilities into the nine test projects, they were each run through AODA. The results of those
tests can be seen in Table ??. In short, AODA was able to detect every one of the thirteen
use-after-free conditions that were injected into the nine Github projects without a single
instance of a false positive.
Real-World Vulnerability In addition to verifying AODA with simple examples, we also
conrm that AODA can detect previously-disclosed vulnerabilities. In particular, we analyze
a vulnerability in Microsoft Internet Explorer (located in tiptsf.dll) that was disclosed as
MS13-069 and CVE-2013-3205. In Figure 67, we can see the AV AIL sets as they were
generated during analysis (some basic blocks omitted). Later we see a use of an object
of type ??0CEditSession@@QAE@P6GJKPAV0@@Z@Z that is not in the AV AILIN set
of the basic block containing the use point. This indicates the presence of a use-after-free
vulnerability. The preceding example represents an interesting case that was caught by
the automated analysis. In this case, there was a use of a class pointer before it was ever
initialized. While this is not strictly use-after-free vulnerability in the textbook sense2, the
1https://github.com/JayXon/Leanify
2From the perspective of an adversary, this is exactly the same - a portion of improperly allocated memory
is accessed by the program.
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Table 6: DLLs containing use-after-free vulnerabilities




























analysis was able to detect it. This is because there was a program point where class type
was used, but not in the AV AILIN set for the containing basic block. Since there is a code
path in which the class pointer was not instantiated, it was not included in the AV AILIN
set.
System32 Directory Results To estimate the extent of use-after-free vulnerabilities
in production operating systems, we ran AODA on 652 binaries found in the system32
directory on a default install of Windows 7. The analysis revealed 127 potential use-after-
free conditions. Table ?? shows the results of the scan of the binaries. These libraries are
often used by popular applications (and are thus popular targets for attackers) like Microsoft
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HRESULT CMyObject :: get_MyProperty(IDispatch **out)
{





Figure 68: Sample code showing a reference counting overow
Oce and Internet Explorer.
6.2 COM Release Failure
Failure to release an object essentially amounts to a memory leak. These failures occur when
a COM interface is referenced through IUnknown::AddRef() or IUnknown::QueryInterface(),
and are later discarded without calling the corresponding IUnknown::Release() function.
Triggering code paths that operate this way can allow an attacker to consume arbitrary
amounts of memory, but more usefully increment the reference count of an object an un-
limited number of times. On a 32-bit machine, by executing the vulnerable code path
0xFFFFFFFF times, an integer overow can be triggered in the object's reference count.
Following that, any call to IUnknown::Release() will cause the object to be de-allocated,
which, again, can lead to stale pointer problems. The code in Figure 68 is based on an
example we previously used; however, it has been modied to demonstrate problems with
failing to release an object.
This example correctly adds a reference to the new callback object when it is set. How-
ever, the previous value held in m_pCallback, if one existed, is overwritten without being
released. Therefore, an attacker can set this property a large number of times and eventually
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HRESULT CMyObject :: get_MyProperty(IDispatch **out)
{





Figure 69: A x for the code shown in Figure 68
axObject.MyProperty = new Object ();
var x = axObject.MyProperty ();
axObject.MyProperty = new Object ();
Figure 70: JavaScript example with a release failure
trigger an integer overow in the reference count variable. Let's try xing it in the following
example:
The above example adds a Release() call to correctly release any previously held objects,
and so no memory leak occurs. Astute readers will notice that this code actually still has
a stale pointer problem. The get_MyProperty() function doesn't add a reference to the
interface being distributed back to the scripting engine. This can be problematic if the only
reference to that interface is held by the plugin, and the plugin releases it. Consider the
following JavaScript snippet:
This JavaScript code results in the following actions taking place:
1. put_MyProperty() retains the only reference to the object we created.
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2. The x variable receives the IDispatch pointer, still there is only one copy of it
3. Setting MyProperty will cause the old object to be deleted, even though x still points
to it.
6.2.1 Detecting COM Release Failures With Static Analysis
Detecting COM release failures is an opportunity for future research. There is a direct
correlation to the Automatic Reference Counting technology employed by Apple's Xcode to
prevent release failures of objective-C objects[16]. While this solution is not perfect, it has




This dissertation describes a number of vulnerabilities that arise due to the practice of
building complex programming language constructs and frameworks on top of a primitive
language that was never intended to support such complexity. Specically, we focus on the
adaptation of the C language by C++ and Microsoft's Component Object Model (COM) to
support object orientation. The vulnerabilities that were identied are grouped into three
categories: those that occur during object instantiation, those that occur during the lifetime
of the object, and those that occur during the deletion of an object.
We demonstrated that when C++ objects are instantiated, security issues can occur
when the object's constructor fails. It is dicult to check whether a C++ object was cre-
ated properly since many of the elements of the object are unveriable. As such, developers
are forced to work with objects whose correctness cannot be guaranteed. We also demon-
strated two issues that can occur during the instantiation of COM objects. The rst is
when a developer fails to explicitly increment the reference counter for the object. Because
COM attempts to automatically reference count objects, it can nd itself in a state where it
improperly decrements the reference count. In this case, if the developer had not explicitly
handled the reference counting, the object could be implicitly deleted without their knowl-
edge. The second issue is similar to that which was show in C++. when a developer fails
to call VariantInit() on a COM object, they later end up operating on an object that has
not been properly initialized, resulting in serious security issues.
Throughout the lifetime of an object, there are security issues that can be encountered as
well. Both C++ and COM suer from design decisions that can easily lead to type confusion
problems. In the case of C++, there is no runtime enforcement of type. With that, objects
are treated as whatever the developer thought they were operating on at a given program
point. Since there are many ways that a class pointer can be manipulated throughout the
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lifetime of the object, there is no way for the developer to guarantee the type of object they
are using at any point. COM does attempt to implement type enforcement, but because this
is built on a foundation that does not support it, what exists is highly imperfect. Developers
(or attackers) can directly inuence the type speciers for a COM object, as well as other
easily confused situations where developers can inadvertently treat one object as the wrong
type. In both C++ and COM, type confusion can lead to exploitation as severe as arbitrary
code execution.
COM suers from additional security issues that can arise during the objects lifetime.
First, copying objects at runtime is far more of a complex operation than it may seem on
the surface. Failures to copy COM objects correctly can lead to developers operating on
incomplete objects, or worse, vulnerabilities leading to arbitrary code execution. Second,
the underlying security model for the loading of COM objects by applications is inherently
awed and easily bypassed.
As objects are deleted, yet further security issues may be encountered. Because C++
objects are build on C, the allocation and freeing of memory to contain objects is at the
discretion of the developer. Developers will often aggressively try to free memory to avoid
memory leaks. This, however, can lead to use-after-free conditions. In Section 6.1, we
showed how this can be exploited. COM, on the other hand, attempts to automatically
reference count and automatically release objects that are no longer in use. As described
above, there are some fundamental aws in this reference counting infrastructure since it is
built on a platform that does not actually support it. With that, developers may aggressively
increment the reference counter which can lead to integer wrapping, and thus unpredictable
deletion of the object.
7.1 Summary of Results
In this section we summarize the results of the solutions that were developed to detect their
corresponding security issues. In these cases, the solution was developed and tested for
eectiveness. Each of the following subsections summarizes those results.
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In Section 5.1.4, we describe a solution to detect C++ type confusion using static anal-
ysis. By employing the data ow analysis techniques documented in Section 5.1.4.2, we
demonstrate that we can increase the eectiveness of existing static analysis techniques on
compiled C++ code, as well as identify a class of vulnerability that is often overlooked by
existing techniques. To test our decompilation framework, we created test programs each
representing one of the four combinations of stack or heap object declaration and inline or
explicit constructor. These programs were compiled without symbols and were provided
to IDA Pro as input. In each case, the system was tested for its ability to resolve virtual
function calls and to identify instances of type confusion. In all test cases, ORDA was
able to resolve the virtual function calls correctly and identify cases where the indirect call
referenced a function pointer outside the object's vtable.
In Section 5.4.5, we describe a solution for preventing trust transitivity problems in
COM objects using runtime enforcement. We tested COMBlocker's eectiveness and mea-
sured the overhead it imposes on a standard desktop system. The rst step in testing the
eectiveness of the solution was to apply it to each of the applications that were found to
be vulnerable in the section above. For each application that was shown to be vulnerable,
COMBlocker presented the user with the appropriate dialog. This dialog box shows that
the application attempted to load a control that is specically denied by the dened policy.
It also indicates that the instantiation of the object was prevented. COMBlocker was suc-
cessfully able to prevent the attack described in Section 5.4.1 in Microsoft WordPad, Word,
Excel, and PowerPoint as well as the ActiveX Control Test Container. Demonstrating the
formal completeness of our solution is dicult. Our mechanism is helped by the fact that
there are only a small number of publicly known means by which COM objects can be in-
stantiated. Injecting COMBlocker at these points should logically prevent applications from
circumventing policy enforcement. However, if applications can instantiate COM objects
through other unknown means such as implementing their own APIs, these interfaces would
also need to be modied and mediated.
A version of COMBlocker was created that logged the time required for each policy
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lookup encountered throughout the operation of an application. The test build was in-
stalled on a typical development workstation and gathered information for all of the COM
object instantiations that occurred during a single day as part of a developer's normal work.
The test workstation was a Windows XP SP3 machine with Oce 2007, Internet Explorer
7, Firefox 3, Lotus Notes 8, Visual Studio 6, and several other commonly installed applica-
tions. During the course of the day, the behavior of the developer caused over 65,000 COM
instantiations. Each of these recorded an average policy lookup time of 554µs to complete,
with a 95% condence interval of ±104µs. The variation in lookup time is largely due to
the fact that consulting the killbit list in the registry is accomplished through a linear scan
of the subkeys; it is not indexed. Testing shows that an average application incurs less than
10 policy lookups per user action. With that, each user action generates less than 5ms of
delay due to COMBlocker. Another data point gathered in this test is that in general, Of-
ce applications and web browsers incurred a lower lookup time than core operating system
components. When the data set is reduced to only Oce applications and web browsers,
the average lookup time drops to 104µs, with a 95% condence interval of ±14.2µs. This
indicates that if performance were an issue in implementing a system like COMBlocker, the
scope of the protection could be reduced to only those applications that are more easily
targeted in COM-based attacks.
In Section 6.1.3, we describe a solution for detecting C++ use-after-free conditions using
static analysis. After implementing the Available Object Denition Analysis described in
Section 6.1.3.1, we tested the framework in four ways. First, we tested it against a series
of simple examples. These examples were used to rst ensure the analysis was functioning
correctly, and allowed for debugging in cases where something was missed. Details on the
steps used can be found in Section 6.1.3.4. The second test was to inject vulnerabilities into
into publicly available projects found on Github. By scanning these projects, we ensure that
our analysis is able to function on real-world applications. The details of how vulnerabilities
were injected into code and tested are covered in detail in Section 6.1.3.4. The results
of these test are summarized in Table ??. The third test was to determine whether the
framework could identify a publicly disclosed vulnerability. We ran the analysis on tiptsf.dll
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Table 7: Github projects with injected vulnerabilities










and successfully identied the vulnerability disclosed as MS13-069 and CVE-2013-3205. The
exact details of how this test was run and the results can be found in Section 6.1.3.4. The
fourth and nal test was to scan the System32 directory of an up-to-date installation of
Windows 7 to see how many use-after-free conditions could be identied. In scanning 652
libraries, we were able to identify 127 use-after-free conditions. Section 6.1.3.4 provides
details on how this test was run. Table ?? summarizes the results.
7.2 Future Work
In this section we summarize those portions of the dissertation which propose new solutions,
but have not been thoroughly developed or tested. Sections 4.1.1 and 4.3.1 discuss future
research that is focused on identifying failures in the instantiation of C++ and COM objects.
Sections 4.2.2 and 6.2.1 discuss potential solutions for detecting failure to retain and release
COM objects. Here we propose researching opportunities similar to Automatic Reference
Counting used in Apple's Xcode. Sections 5.2.4 and 5.3.2 discuss areas of future research
for detecting security issues that arise during the lifetime of COM objects.
7.3 Final Thoughts
In this dissertation, we have shown how building high-level programming constructs on a
primitive language has led to security issues. Previous attempts to analyze binary code that
was developed at these higher-levels have proven to struggle. This is due to the fact that
they still operate at the lowest levels of context. By elevating the context of the analyses
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Table 8: DLLs containing use-after-free vulnerabilities





























closer to that of the original language, we have been able to address the higher-level security
issues. We have shown that these analyses can be highly eective in detecting and remedying
security issues that would not have been addressable at a lower level of context. With this
work, we expect that security analysts will be able to identify security issues in existing
applications that were previously undetectable.
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Appendix A
The following code is the LLVM intermediate representation generated for the binary code
shown in Figure 39b.
; ModuleID = 'classbug2.bc'
%0 = type { i32 (...)** , i32 }
@dummyClass = weak_odr constant [100 x i32 (...)*] [i32 (...)*
@dummyFunc , i32 (...)* @dummyFunc , i32 (...)* @dummyFunc , i32 (...)*
@dummyFunc , i32 (...)* @dummyFunc , i32 (...)* @dummyFunc , i32 (...)*
@dummyFunc , i32 (...)* @dummyFunc] ; <[100 x i32 (...)*]* > [#uses =0]
@off_402138 = weak_odr constant [4 x i32 (...)*] [i32 (...)* bitcast
(i32 (i32)* @sub_4010B0 to i32 (...)*) , i32 (...)* bitcast (i32 ()*
@sub_401080 to i32 (...)*) , i32 (...)* bitcast (i32 ()* @nullsub_1 to
i32 (...)*) , i32 (...)* bitcast (i32 ()* @sub_401090 to i32 (...)*)] ;
<[4 x i32 (...)*]* > [#uses =1]
@off_40214C = weak_odr constant [2 x i32 (...)*] [i32 (...)* bitcast (i32
(i32)* @sub_4010B0 to i32 (...)*) , i32 (...)* bitcast (i32 ()*
@sub_4010C0 to i32 (...)*)] ; <[2 x i32 (...)*]* > [#uses =1]
declare i32 @dummyFunc (...)
define i32 @_wmain(i32 %Arg_esi) {
"401000":
%0 = call i8* @"??2 @YAPAXI@Z "() ; <i8*> [#uses =2]
%Class1 = alloca %0* ; <%0**> [#uses =2]
%Class0 = alloca %0* ; <%0**> [#uses =2]
%1 = ptrtoint i8* %0 to i32 ; <i32 > [#uses =1]
%2 = icmp eq i32 %1, 0 ; <i1> [#uses =1]
br i1 %2, label %"401019" , label %"401010"
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"401010": ; preds = %"401000"
%3 = call i32 @sub_401070 () ; <i32 > [#uses =1]
%4 = inttoptr i32 %3 to %0** ; <%0**> [#uses =2]
%5 = bitcast %0** %4 to i8* ; <i8*> [#uses =1]
%6 = load %0** %4 ; <%0*> [#uses =1]
store %0* %6, %0** %Class0
br label %"40101b"
"401019": ; preds = %"401000"
%7 = alloca i32 ; <i32*> [#uses =2]
store i32 0, i32* %7
%8 = load i32* %7, align 4 ; <i32 > [#uses =1]
%9 = inttoptr i32 %8 to %0** ; <%0**> [#uses =1]
br label %"40101b"
"40101b": ; preds = %"401019" , %"401010"
%10 = phi i8* [ %0, %"401019" ], [ %5, %"401010" ] ; <i8*> [#uses =0]
%11 = phi %0** [ %9, %"401019" ], [ %Class0 , %"401010" ] ;
<%0**> [#uses =2]
%12 = call i8* @"??2 @YAPAXI@Z "() ; <i8*> [#uses =2]
%13 = ptrtoint i8* %12 to i32 ; <i32 > [#uses =1]
%14 = icmp eq i32 %13, 0 ; <i1 > [#uses =1]
br i1 %14, label %"401032" , label %"401029"
"401029": ; preds = %"40101b"
%15 = call i32 @sub_4010A0 () ; <i32 > [#uses =1]
%16 = inttoptr i32 %15 to %0** ; <%0**> [#uses =2]
%17 = bitcast %0** %16 to i8* ; <i8*> [#uses =1]
%18 = load %0** %16 ; <%0*> [#uses =1]
store %0* %18, %0** %Class1
br label %"401034"
"401032": ; preds = %"40101b"
%19 = alloca i32 ; <i32*> [#uses =2]
store i32 0, i32* %19, align 4
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%20 = load i32* %19, align 4 ; <i32 > [#uses =1]
%21 = inttoptr i32 %20 to %0** ; <%0**> [#uses =1]
br label %"401034"
"401034": ; preds = %"401032" , %"401029"
%22 = phi i8* [ %12, %"401032" ], [ %17, %"401029" ] ;
<i8*> [#uses =0]
%23 = phi %0** [ %21, %"401032" ], [ %Class1 , %"401029" ] ;
<%0**> [#uses =3]
%24 = load %0** %11, align 4 ; <%0*> [#uses =1]
%25 = getelementptr %0* %24, i32 0, i32 0 ; <i32 (...)*** > [#uses =1]
%26 = load i32 (...)*** %25, align 4 ; <i32 (...)** > [#uses =1]
%27 = getelementptr i32 (...)** %26, i32 0 ; <i32 (...)** > [#uses =1]
%28 = load i32 (...)** %27 ; <i32 (...)* > [#uses =1]
%29 = bitcast i32 (...)* %28 to void ()* ; <void ()*> [#uses =1]
call void %29()
%30 = load %0** %11, align 4 ; <%0*> [#uses =1]
%31 = getelementptr %0* %30, i32 0, i32 0 ; <i32 (...)*** > [#uses =1]
%32 = load i32 (...)*** %31, align 4 ; <i32 (...)** > [#uses =1]
%33 = getelementptr i32 (...)** %32, i32 1 ; <i32 (...)** > [#uses =1]
%34 = load i32 (...)** %33 ; <i32 (...)* > [#uses =1]
%35 = bitcast i32 (...)* %34 to void ()* ; <void ()*> [#uses =1]
call void %35()
%36 = load %0** %23, align 4 ; <%0*> [#uses =1]
%37 = getelementptr inbounds %0* %36, i32 0, i32 0 ;
<i32 (...)*** > [#uses =1]
%38 = load i32 (...)*** %37, align 4 ; <i32 (...)** > [#uses =1]
%39 = getelementptr i32 (...)** %38, i32 0 ; <i32 (...)** > [#uses =1]
%40 = load i32 (...)** %39 ; <i32 (...)* > [#uses =1]
%41 = bitcast i32 (...)* %40 to void ()* ; <void ()*> [#uses =1]
call void %41()
%42 = load %0** %23, align 4 ; <%0*> [#uses =1]
%43 = getelementptr inbounds %0* %42, i32 0, i32 0 ;
<i32 (...)*** > [#uses =1]
%44 = load i32 (...)*** %43, align 4 ; <i32 (...)** > [#uses =1]
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%45 = getelementptr i32 (...)** %44, i32 1 ; <i32 (...)** > [#uses =1]
%46 = load i32 (...)** %45 ; <i32 (...)* > [#uses =1]
%47 = bitcast i32 (...)* %46 to void ()* ; <void ()*> [#uses =1]
call void %47()
%48 = load %0** %23, align 4 ; <%0*> [#uses =1]
%49 = getelementptr inbounds %0* %48, i32 0, i32 0 ;
<i32 (...)*** > [#uses =1]
%50 = load i32 (...)*** %49, align 4 ; <i32 (...)** > [#uses =1]
%51 = getelementptr i32 (...)** %50, i32 3 ; <i32 (...)** > [#uses =1]
%52 = load i32 (...)** %51 ; <i32 (...)* > [#uses =1]
%53 = bitcast i32 (...)* %52 to void ()* ; <void ()*> [#uses =1]
call void %53()
%54 = alloca i32 ; <i32*> [#uses =2]
store i32 0, i32* %54, align 4
%55 = load i32* %54, align 4 ; <i32 > [#uses =0]
br label %return
return: ; preds = %"401034"
ret i32 0
}
define i32 @sub_401070 () {
"401070":
%0 = alloca %0* ; <%0**> [#uses =2]
%1 = load %0** %0, align 4 ; <%0*> [#uses =1]
%2 = getelementptr inbounds %0* %1, i32 0, i32 0 ;
<i32 (...)*** > [#uses =1]
%3 = getelementptr inbounds [4 x i32 (...)*]*
@off_402138 , i32 0, i32 0 ; <i32 (...)** > [#uses =1]
store i32 (...)** %3, i32 (...)*** %2
%4 = load %0** %0, align 4 ; <%0*> [#uses =1]
%5 = getelementptr inbounds %0* %4, i32 0, i32 1 ;
<i32*> [#uses =1]
store i32 0, i32* %5, align 4
br label %return
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return: ; preds = %"401070"
ret i32 0
}
define i32 @sub_4010A0 () {
"4010a0":
%0 = alloca %0* ; <%0**> [#uses =2]
%1 = load %0** %0, align 4 ; <%0*> [#uses =1]
%2 = getelementptr inbounds %0* %1, i32 0, i32 0 ;
<i32 (...)*** > [#uses =1]
%3 = getelementptr inbounds [2 x i32 (...)*]*
@off_40214C , i32 0, i32 0 ; <i32 (...)** > [#uses =1]
store i32 (...)** %3, i32 (...)*** %2
%4 = load %0** %0, align 4 ; <%0*> [#uses =1]
%5 = getelementptr inbounds %0* %4, i32 0, i32 1 ; <i32*> [#uses =1]
store i32 0, i32* %5, align 4
br label %return
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